Trump Critics Serve Best as Insiders

The ongoing Trump transition has recently sparked debate over whether Republicans who disagreed with the president-elect's policies should now accept positions in his administration. Those who argue against service point to issues of conscience and principle, asserting that maintaining the perceived moral high ground necessitates sitting out. Others advise that it would be easier to influence policy from the inside, and that service is a patriotic duty.

Yet, history in fact demonstrates that neither of these propositions is entirely correct. Wielding influence and furthering one's moral principles need not be mutually exclusive — and achieving both aims is often only possible from within the president's inner circle. Presidents typically welcome dissenting views from trusted advisers, even from those who frequently disagree with them. At times, these disagreements have led to more humane policies.

The role of dissent in shaping U.S. foreign policy on mass atrocities is particularly illustrative. U.S. government officials have consistently disagreed on how the United States should respond to these crises, from the Armenian Genocide, to the Holocaust, to atrocities in Bosnia. Those who lack access to the president often resign in protest, or use official dissent channels, both of which fail to change policy. Members of the inner circle, on the other hand, use their access to the president and his trust to quietly suggest a change in course with consistent success.

Take the example of the Holocaust. In 1943, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. received information from State Department informants and Treasury underlings that certain State officials were suppressing information about the Holocaust, blocking rescue measures favored by President Roosevelt, and attempting to cover their tracks. In January 1944, Morgenthau met with Roosevelt to share this information and ask him to create a new government agency charged with rescuing victims of enemy oppression.

Though he was a close friend of Roosevelt's, Morgenthau was nevertheless often a thorn in his side, frequently disagreeing with him. Still, Roosevelt listened to his close adviser, ordering a policy reversal through executive order that saved the lives of some 200,000 potential Holocaust victims.

In the summer of 1995, then–U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright highlighted U.S. failures in responding to atrocities in Bosnia with a dissenting memorandum that sparked a widespread policy review. Albright would argue that without a change in strategy, President Clinton would face a political nightmare: He would be forced to deploy U.S. ground troops to Bosnia to evacuate a failed U.N. peacekeeping force at the height of the 1996 presidential election.

Albright had voiced her opinion despite being largely dismissed by other members of the Clinton foreign policy team. Indeed, as David Halberstam has documented, her poor treatment contributed to her decision to stop attending meetings in person. Nevertheless, Clinton valued her presence on the team and, in August 1995, he changed his strategy, largely following Albright's recommendations and launching Operation Deliberate Force — the military intervention that successfully brought warring parties to the negotiating table and ended the conflict.

At times, dissent does surface among members outside the inner circle, but with typically poor effects. During the atrocities in Bosnia, a number of lower-level State Department officials used official dissent channels, or resigned in protest, also with limited effectiveness. Inner-circle members simply have more influence, and private access, that allows them to quietly disagree and dialogue with the president to improve policy.

Now imagine if Morgenthau, his subordinates at Treasury, and his informants at State had refused to serve in an administration that had done little overall to respond to the Holocaust. Or, suppose President Clinton had taken cues from the rest of his foreign policy team, and Albright had been completely silenced and isolated. In the former case, hundreds of thousands of lives would have been lost. In the latter, the Bosnian conflict would have undoubtedly continued longer, and the president's reputation at home and abroad would have suffered.

The implication of these stories is twofold: first, inner-circle status is typically needed to shape policy; and second, presidents benefit from inner-circle members who are willing to thoughtfully, and privately, disagree with them. As the transition continues, both potential appointees and the president-elect should keep these important historical lessons in mind.