Book Chapter - National Bureau of Asian Research
Nuclear Ambition and Tension on the Korean Peninsula
With origins dating back to the late 1960s, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has evolved to be a multipurpose instrument of the regime’s security strategy. The regime’s goals include deterring adversaries with its nuclear arsenal, generating revenue from nuclear commerce, and creating a North Korean version of President Dwight Eisenhower’s New Look policy. In particular, given internal constraints related to a domestic economy that lacks basic infrastructure, the regime appears to be improving its nuclear arsenal as one means to compensate for a rapidly deteriorating conventional military. If North Korea stays on this course, then it will likely conduct more nuclear tests to miniaturize a warhead design, as well as launch more ballistic missiles to increase range and payload, with grave regional and global consequences.
About This Book Chapter
Nuclear Ambition and Tension on the Korean Peninsula
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For Academic Citation:
Park, John.. “Nuclear Ambition and Tension on the Korean Peninsula.” In Strategic Asia 2013-14: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age, Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, Oct 2, 2013.
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With origins dating back to the late 1960s, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has evolved to be a multipurpose instrument of the regime’s security strategy. The regime’s goals include deterring adversaries with its nuclear arsenal, generating revenue from nuclear commerce, and creating a North Korean version of President Dwight Eisenhower’s New Look policy. In particular, given internal constraints related to a domestic economy that lacks basic infrastructure, the regime appears to be improving its nuclear arsenal as one means to compensate for a rapidly deteriorating conventional military. If North Korea stays on this course, then it will likely conduct more nuclear tests to miniaturize a warhead design, as well as launch more ballistic missiles to increase range and payload, with grave regional and global consequences.
About This Book Chapter
- Recommended
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Journal Article - CSS Policy Perspectives
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In the Spotlight
Most Viewed
Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security
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