Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace

| Winter 2016/17

Summary

Can states deter adversaries in cyberspace? Analogies drawn from nuclear deterrence mislead; nuclear deterrence aims for total prevention, whereas states do not expect to prevent every cyberattack. Additionally, cyber deterrence is possible even though it can be hard to identify the source of a cyberattack. Attribution problems do not hinder three of the major forms of cyber deterrence: denial, entanglement, and normative taboos.

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For more information on this publication: Please contact International Security
For Academic Citation:

Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace," International Security, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Winter 2016/17), pp. 44–71.

The Author

Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

Joseph S. Nye

  • Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor
  • Member of the Board, Belfer Center
  • Faculty Affiliate, Future of Diplomacy Project
Expertise:
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