Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Bullets for Ballots: Electoral Participation Provisions and Enduring Peace after Civil Conflict

    Author:
  • Aila M. Matanock
| Spring 2017

Summary

What kinds of peace agreements are most likely to prevent civil conflicts from recurring? Does holding elections after a civil war make enduring peace more likely? Agreements mandating that rebels be allowed to participate in post-conflict elections alongside the government are more likely to succeed, because such elections attract the engagement of international organizations that can reward compliance with the agreement and punish noncompliance.

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For Academic Citation:

Aila M. Matanock, "Bullets for Ballots: Electoral Participation Provisions and Enduring Peace after Civil Conflict," International Security, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Spring 2017), pp. 93–132.

The Author

Aila M. Matanock

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