The George W. Bush administration’s assessments of challenges that might come after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq were wide of the mark, but it is unclear why this was the case. An established psychological theory that describes how peoplementally represent distant future actions—as opposed to those that are seen as impending—explains the nature of strategic assessment in the Iraq case. As individuals think about actions at the end of a sequence of events, the desirability of their goals becomes increasingly salient relative to the feasibility of achieving them. This makes decisionmakers more prone to underestimate the costs and risks of future actions.

"...Obama is unlikely to decrease his commitment to Afghanistan, even if assessments of the situation there grow increasingly dire. Instead he will probably opt to push the day of reckoning down the road. This is not just cynical politics on Obama's part. Powerful, success-oriented individuals tend to believe they can find solutions to even the most intractable problems if they are given enough time. As a result, they underestimate the long-term risks and costs of their actions."