The path to acquiring a peaceful civilian nuclear program is fraught with challenges for countries in the Middle East. Given Israel's proactive policies in preventing the proliferation of its neighbors and nuclear supplier states' consternation about the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, Arab states face  a number of unique obstacles in acquiring foreign nuclear assistance. Yet as the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) recent success in courting the assistance of a number of nuclear supplier states demonstrates, these obstacles are not insurmountable. This piece explores the UAE's strategies in obtaining foreign nuclear assistance to uncover the generalizable insights that may be of use to other Middle Eastern countries seeking to develop peaceful nuclear programs.

The swiftness with which the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has launched its civil nuclear program presents a number of challenges for policymakers in seeking to ensure the program's safety and security. At the onset of its efforts, the UAE government consulted with a set of the world's leading nuclear suppliers to develop a framework that would help its nuclear program conform to the highest standards in terms of safety, security, and nonproliferation. The UAE drew on these consultations in making a sweeping set of international commitments in April 2008 to ensure that the sensitive nuclear materials and technologies it would acquire as part of its nuclear program would be securely controlled.1 While the UAE has been widely praised for the depth and breadth of the nonproliferation commitments it has made, it will be the UAE's efficacy at complying with them by which its success will be judged.

Facing the economic crisis, the US government should rethink existing economic sanctions' policies.

From the abstract:

"Drawing on the realist and liberal paradigms, this piece develops two competing theories to account for third-party sanctions-busting...The results offer strong support for the liberal theory of sanctions-busting and less support for the realist theory. In particular, the analysis reveals a counter-intuitive finding that a sender's close allies are more likely to sanctions-bust on the target's behalf than are other states."

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In a Dubai Initiative Brown Bag Seminar on February 6, 2009, Bryan Early discussed how economic sanctions affect their targets' trade with third party states. Listen to an audio recording of his presentation and the discussion that followed.

The article explains why in September 1991, shortly after the attempted putsch against Gorbachev, George H.W. Bush launched the unilateral Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs). The PNIs were measures that led to the largest reductions in the American and Soviet/Russian nuclear arsenals to date The article argues that an explanation rooted in prospect theory and a focus on Bush as an individual decision-maker offers the most explanatory power.