Speaker: Melissa Willard-Foster, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Vermont

Contrary to the dominant view that instability makes targets of coercive pressure more likely to concede, the speaker will argue that instability prolongs their resistance. Leaders' policies reflect their domestic political interests, thus, conceding to policy change invites political costs. The more powerful a leader's domestic opposition, the more likely it can benefit when the leader is forced to make a costly concession. Although resistance may be costly too, targets can more easily mitigate these costs than they can convince the challenger to change its demands. As a result, instability is more likely to encourage a target's resistance. The speaker tests her argument on Libya's rapprochement with the West, showing that Qaddafi refused to surrender the Pan Am flight 103 bombing suspects due to domestic political costs. It was only after Qaddafi recovered his power and the United States softened its terms that he complied, which paved the way for the 2003 deal.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

The U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are part of a long history of attempts by major powers to impose regimes on militarily weak states. That the strong should target the weak has largely gone unquestioned by scholars, who assume that militarily weak states suffer regime change most, because they can do little to stop it. But if a major power can easily topple a weak regime, then it stands to reason that the regime would accommodate the major power, long before a confrontation can develop. The central puzzle of foreign-imposed regime change is therefore that asymmetric power makes it possible, but it should also make it unnecessary.

Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

Why do great powers use force to support or overthrow foreign governments? This seminar will discuss how the domestic political incentives of ruling parties in targeted states interact with the strategic incentives of great powers to produce a rationale for great power foreign military intervention.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

Scholars generally agree that ad hoc wartime coalitions tend to collapse when discord over policies erupts postwar. As such, theory suggests that states able to be selective in their partnerships may be better off with like-minded allies. But when it comes to choosing whether to remove or reinstate the defeated regime, allies at odds may not be so dispensable, while like-minded ones may not be so helpful.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come-first served basis.