Davide Fiammenghi;  Sebastian Rosato and Joseph M. Parent; and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, and Norrin M. Ripsman respond to Kevin Narizny's Fall 2017 article, “On Systemic Paradigms and Domestic Politics: A Critique of the Newest Realism.”

Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher, David M. McCourt and Andrew Glencross, Norrin M. Ripsman, Mark S. Sheetz and Jean-Yves Haine respond to Sebastian Rosato's spring 2011 article, "Europe’s Troubles: Power Politics and the State of the European Project."

Andrew Barros, Talbot Imlay, and Evan Resnick reply to Norrin Ripsman and Jack Levy's Fall 2008 International Security article, "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s."

British appeasement was primarily a strategy of buying time for rearmament against Germany. British leaders understood the Nazi menace and did not expect that appeasement would avoid an eventual war with Germany. They believed that by the time of the Rhineland crisis of 1936 the balance of power had already shifted in Germany’sfavor, but that British rearmament would work to reverse the balance by the end of the decade. Appeasement was a strategy to delay an expected confrontation with Germany until the military balance was more favorable.