A sampling of Belfer Center fellows and affiliates in the news.

Do insurgent groups use external funding, involvement in illicit economics, and looted resources to increase their military resilience, or do increased resources lead to a lack of discipline? A new study suggests that both outcomes are possible, and the answer depends on the group’s underlying social network. Groups with strong ties among their leaders as well as to their local communities are able to utilize resources to increase their fighting power and organizational capacity, whereas groups with weak ties are more likely to degenerate into greedy bands of thieves.  It is therefore important that policymakers understand and consider the social and organizational bases of insurgent groups.

"Neither Americans nor Indians always understand how threatening their military strength can look to weaker countries. This dynamic is clearly at play in the case of Pakistan — Indians feel that they are self-evidently not a threat, while Americans are often baffled that Pakistani security elites care so much about India, which to the U.S. looks like a positive force for stability and democracy. At the end of the day, however, the world does not look the same from Rawalpindi and Islamabad as it does from Washington, and the U.S. needs to remember these differing goals, incentives, and fears as it pursues its vital interests in the region."

"...[T]he era of mass protest has returned after a grim period in which brutal, extremely violent insurgency and counterinsurgency dominated political life in Kashmir. This political mobilization is often inspired or directed by political leaders of various ideologies, but it shows that mass unrest and disaffection have not disappeared. They are now being expressed openly, and in significant numbers. While in Kashmir it is impossible to miss the depth of sentiment against Indian policy...."

"All of these pathologies were evident in the failure to prevent or appropriately respond to the Mumbai attacks. There was in fact significant intelligence suggesting a seaborne terrorist attack was likely, and even that prominent sites such as the Taj Hotel would be targeted. This information, however, was ignored by several key bureaucratic actors—including the Coast Guard and the Maharashtra state director-general of police—because it was deemed unactionable. Others, such as the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad, at least attempted some kind of preparation. The differences in readiness highlight the extent of fragmentation among the security apparatus. Even when Mumbai police tried to take preventive action, they lacked the manpower to sustain increased security at the hotels. Once the attack occurred, the security forces did not have sufficient night-vision equipment, heavy weaponry, or information about the attack sites, leading to a long response time and the emergence of a disastrous siege...."

Instead of special envoys and summits, the U.S. should adopt a "quiet diplomacy" approach that offers incentives to India and Pakistan for making tangible, if small, progress on the ground in Kashmir. The U.S. should offer to help fund sustained local policy initiatives in both Indian and Pakistani-administered Kashmir aimed at improving governance and encouraging economic exchange and the movement of people across the Line of Control. An initiative focused on local government and civil society lacks the drama of shuttle diplomacy and grand bargains, but can actually improve the daily lives of Kashmiris while giving them more say over their own governance.

Counterinsurgency is one of the most important topics facing policymakers and scholars. Existing studies of counterinsurgency are very valuable, but sometimes adhere too strictly to sweeping dichotomies and paradigms. This article discusses ten specific mechanisms that lead counterinsurgent governments to squander their generally overwhelming power advantages. This mechanism-based approach can improve both policy and scholarly analysis.