The authors write that much has changed for Mukhtar "Abu Mansur" Robow, a key founding member of the Somali jihadist organization al-Shabaab, over the past decade. In November 2008, al-Shabaab was sweeping across southern and central Somalia toward the capital city of Mogadishu. Robow led the jihadists not only in their fight against the Somali government and allied international forces but also in their enactment of territorial governance and implementation of a harsh form of Islamic law. Ten years later, in October 2018, Robow, who once condemned democracy as "unbelief," announced his candidacy for the presidency of Somalia’s South West State.

On October 14, a terrorist bombing shook Somalia, one of the deadliest since its civil war in 1991. Hundreds were killed and wounded after a suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden truck along a main road between Mogadishu’s K4 and K5 districts. It was but one such attack that day. The others had failed. Two weeks later, a second major attack rocked the capital on October 28, targeting the popular Naso-Hablod Hotel and killing several senior government and military officials. The gunmen who carried out the attack used uniforms and identity cards from the country's National Intelligence and Security Agency to infiltrate the building. Despite the new signs of public unity across Somalia's divided society, the question remains: Is this violent episode a signal of a resurgent al Shabaab or will it finally trigger a fundamental and lasting change in the country's ongoing insurgency and political situation?

Although it may seem that the Muslim Brotherhood has weakened since the onset of the "Arab Winter" in 2013 and onward, organizations with their origins in the Brotherhood still have access to power in countries as diverse as Somalia, Bahrain, Morocco, and Yemen, and might regain power in other countries as well. Most Brotherhood-affiliated movements are committed to some form of democracy, unlike many of their rivals in the Middle East. Even the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have sought allies among Brotherhood affiliates, despite banning a majority of affiliated organizations.  A critical dialogue can promote Brotherhood thinking that supports political consensus, ease the transition to a more stable Middle East, and support a positive direction in political Islam.

The most important action for the United States to take in the current situation is to ease tensions between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and continue to pressure both countries to improve their investigation of individuals supporting al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Qatar's unorthodox diplomacy, their provision of a stable, strategically situated basing area, and their record in bringing to light human rights issues in the Middle East could actually be useful for United States.

"There are, of course, valid critiques of the Brotherhood. Parts of the group call for the death penalty for apostasy, for example. Another equally important critique was the Egyptian Brotherhood’s failure to seek consensus during the country’s political transition. But the best way forward is to support the group’s more mainstream factions while censuring its more extreme subgroups. A ban would only hurt American interests, particularly when it comes to fighting terrorism and countering Russia and Iran’s influence in the Middle East. What the United States needs is critical engagement with the Brotherhood, through discussions and constructive critique—not an outright ban."

"What explains the Islamic State's disappointing record in Africa? Perhaps its leaders underestimated the historical ties between many African jihadi organizations and al Qaeda. Almost certainly they underestimated many African jihadi leaders' desire for autonomy, a trait that sat uneasily with the Islamic State's vision of centralized control through a caliphate. But the Islamic State also failed to back up its rhetorical appeals for loyalty with material support."