At 10:00 AM on May 20th, Sven-Eric Fikenscher will present an MTA Seminar, titled "Regaining Lost Pride: The Impact of Status Claims on Nuclear Policy." This presentation will enquire into the meaning and implications of status-seeking in the nuclear realm. The status-seeking notion is a particularly contentious one, since there is not even a consensus in the literature on whether status-seekers are prone to proliferate (as most first-generation analyses point out) or likely to exercise restraint (as the majority of more recent studies claim). Fikenscher will argue that a country’s nuclear policy is shaped by a government’s claimed level of importance and its perception of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The more the nuclear non-proliferation regime is perceived to undermine a government’s claims to greatness, the more likely that government is to pursue a nuclear weapons program. The theoretical model’s explanatory power is being tested in the context of India’s nuclear tests and overall test ban policy. Coffee and tea provided - open to the public!

Past research on the demand-side of nuclear proliferation largely suggests that states cross the nuclear threshold as a result of material cost-benefit calculations, provided that they have the technical ability to do so. Common explanations for a country’s decision to go nuclear highlight its lack of security, the scientific community’s interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, and an “inward-looking” government’s desire to boost domestic support. However, a separate literature emphasizes normative and psychological elements, such as the lack of norms and democratic institutions, as well as the worldview and emotions of leaders.

India’s decisions to conduct nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998 and taking preparations for tests but ultimately refraining from carrying them out in the early 1980s, 1995, and 1996 present a challenge to both meta-theoretical approaches. While most of the above-mentioned concepts cannot explain India’s nuclear policy, others might account for some incidents but are hard to reconcile with all. This triggers the question of what we can learn from the empirics to make the theoretical arguments more conclusive. It is suggested that substantial insights about the blind spots of several proliferation models can be derived from the broader IR theories invoked by the respective propositions.

This seminar will discuss a plausibility probe of two proliferation models by applying them to India's nuclear testing policy, a country equally concerned about its lack of power and social esteem.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

This talk will examine the pivotal roles of Iran, Israel, and the United States in the attempts to establish a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East.

In 2010, the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) called for the establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East and for a conference to be attended by all states from the region to be held in 2012 as a first step to facilitate this goal. Past attempts to advance regional arms control failed because negotiators could not overcome the stalemate between Israel and the Arab states, mainly Egypt. This seminar argues that this sorry state of regional arms control can be changed by building on the NPT Review Conference's mandate, covering delivery systems as well. Instead of repeating the mistake of allowing negotiations to be dominated by the old Israeli-Arab juxtaposition, a focus on delivery systems would address the concerns of all parties in the region.