Analysis & Opinions - Izvestia
19-Year-Old Grandfathers
Note
In Russia, young men are drafted into the military for 2 years to fulfill their mandatory service requirement. Second-year and older soldiers, many of whom are only 19 or 20 years old, are sometimes referred to as grandfathers—dyedy. But they are not the kind and warm-hearted grandpas of a child's normal experience. The dyedy abuse younger, first-year soldiers and trainees; stealing their meager pay, belongings, and rations. In many cases dyedy, with the acquiescence and sometimes participation of their unit officers, rent or sell their soldiers as laborers to those who will pay. In some extreme cases younger soldiers have been sold into slavery to Islamic rebels and criminals. Beatings, hazing, even torture of younger soldiers are frequent occurrences.
I am an American Army General who spent his career defending against, and later working with, the Russian military. I have great respect for the officers and soldiers of the Russian Army who, like us, dedicate their lives while in uniform to the service of their nation. It is from that perspective that I violate a personal and professional rule not to offer advice to my Russian counterparts about how to run their military.
In all my years of study and research on the Russian military, I could never square the continued existence of brutal hazing, “dedovshchina”, within an organization which produced great military thinkers such as Tukhachevskiy, Ogarkov, and Gareev; achieved phenomenal victories at Stalingrad, Kursk, and Berlin; and inspired such literature as War and Peace or Vasiliy Tyerkin. Whether it was naiveté or a lack of understanding, I considered dedovshchina an aberration — something which could be expunged from the Russian system if only enough attention were given it: a condition which would fade away as fair wages and decent living accommodations for the military were achieved. Perhaps this is even how many Russian officers thought about the condition.
But, a few years ago I came to realize that dedovshchina is much more sinister and endemic and the recent case of the torture of Private Andrei Sychyov has made crystal clear for everyone that the military cannot wait for the improvement of living conditions to end the scourge of dedovshchina. I know many trustworthy and dedicated Russian officers who, working together, are capable of attacking this problem and who desire to do so. At a moment like this however, there may be more energy than ideas about how to proceed. Although no one asked, I would like to respectfully suggest three steps which may be helpful in addressing the problem of dedovshchina.
First, the existence of dedovshchina and other crime in a military organization must be recognized as a failure of leadership. Training subordinate leaders how to properly treat soldiers and then checking to make sure they adhere to that training is a basic universal duty of a military leader. Training must be continuous, beginning with induction, and delivered to all; soldiers, cadets, officers, and civilians. The chain of command must be held personally responsible for the occurrence of dedovshchina in their units, and leaders must be publicly prosecuted and punished when crimes occur.
Second, the Ministry of Defense should establish a staff office at every level in the military whose sole duty is to assist the chain of command in combating and reporting dedovshchina. Through these offices the military would support commanders with training materials and expertise in combating hazing. Soldiers would be able to use these offices as a means to confidentially report instances of hazing when they felt they could not confide in their commanders.
Third, the creation and training of a professional noncommissioned officer corps would go a long way toward helping eradicate dedovshchina. A professional noncommissioned officer may cost more than a private, but he costs much less than an officer, so the military can have many more of them ensuring discipline and order in the barracks. It is a capability that many armies have found worth the investment.
Finally, the elimination of dedovshchina cannot only be the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense. Dedovshchina is not just a commander’s problem; it is the Army’s, government’s, and nation’s problem. Government must increase the wages of military servicemen, improve their housing and become more involved in the military’s business. The Duma must investigate and examine what is going on in the military and pass laws to help, or force, the military to fix problems. The entire nation must refuse to tolerate this crime in their military. Parents, teachers, businessmen all share the risks from a military weakened by the abuse of its most valuable resource — its soldiers.
There are many cases in Russia’s proud history when the military turned a disaster into a victory by sheer will and hard work. That is what is needed here, on the part of the whole country. But, you don’t need an American to tell you that.
BG (ret) Kevin Ryan is a former Defense Attaché toMoscowand currently works as a Senior Fellow at theBelfer Centerfor Science and International Affairs, Harvard’sJohn F. Kennedy Schoolof Government
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For Academic Citation:
Ryan, B.G. Kevin.“19-Year-Old Grandfathers.” Izvestia, January 31, 2006.
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Note
In Russia, young men are drafted into the military for 2 years to fulfill their mandatory service requirement. Second-year and older soldiers, many of whom are only 19 or 20 years old, are sometimes referred to as grandfathers—dyedy. But they are not the kind and warm-hearted grandpas of a child's normal experience. The dyedy abuse younger, first-year soldiers and trainees; stealing their meager pay, belongings, and rations. In many cases dyedy, with the acquiescence and sometimes participation of their unit officers, rent or sell their soldiers as laborers to those who will pay. In some extreme cases younger soldiers have been sold into slavery to Islamic rebels and criminals. Beatings, hazing, even torture of younger soldiers are frequent occurrences.
I am an American Army General who spent his career defending against, and later working with, the Russian military. I have great respect for the officers and soldiers of the Russian Army who, like us, dedicate their lives while in uniform to the service of their nation. It is from that perspective that I violate a personal and professional rule not to offer advice to my Russian counterparts about how to run their military.
In all my years of study and research on the Russian military, I could never square the continued existence of brutal hazing, “dedovshchina”, within an organization which produced great military thinkers such as Tukhachevskiy, Ogarkov, and Gareev; achieved phenomenal victories at Stalingrad, Kursk, and Berlin; and inspired such literature as War and Peace or Vasiliy Tyerkin. Whether it was naiveté or a lack of understanding, I considered dedovshchina an aberration — something which could be expunged from the Russian system if only enough attention were given it: a condition which would fade away as fair wages and decent living accommodations for the military were achieved. Perhaps this is even how many Russian officers thought about the condition.
But, a few years ago I came to realize that dedovshchina is much more sinister and endemic and the recent case of the torture of Private Andrei Sychyov has made crystal clear for everyone that the military cannot wait for the improvement of living conditions to end the scourge of dedovshchina. I know many trustworthy and dedicated Russian officers who, working together, are capable of attacking this problem and who desire to do so. At a moment like this however, there may be more energy than ideas about how to proceed. Although no one asked, I would like to respectfully suggest three steps which may be helpful in addressing the problem of dedovshchina.
First, the existence of dedovshchina and other crime in a military organization must be recognized as a failure of leadership. Training subordinate leaders how to properly treat soldiers and then checking to make sure they adhere to that training is a basic universal duty of a military leader. Training must be continuous, beginning with induction, and delivered to all; soldiers, cadets, officers, and civilians. The chain of command must be held personally responsible for the occurrence of dedovshchina in their units, and leaders must be publicly prosecuted and punished when crimes occur.
Second, the Ministry of Defense should establish a staff office at every level in the military whose sole duty is to assist the chain of command in combating and reporting dedovshchina. Through these offices the military would support commanders with training materials and expertise in combating hazing. Soldiers would be able to use these offices as a means to confidentially report instances of hazing when they felt they could not confide in their commanders.
Third, the creation and training of a professional noncommissioned officer corps would go a long way toward helping eradicate dedovshchina. A professional noncommissioned officer may cost more than a private, but he costs much less than an officer, so the military can have many more of them ensuring discipline and order in the barracks. It is a capability that many armies have found worth the investment.
Finally, the elimination of dedovshchina cannot only be the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense. Dedovshchina is not just a commander’s problem; it is the Army’s, government’s, and nation’s problem. Government must increase the wages of military servicemen, improve their housing and become more involved in the military’s business. The Duma must investigate and examine what is going on in the military and pass laws to help, or force, the military to fix problems. The entire nation must refuse to tolerate this crime in their military. Parents, teachers, businessmen all share the risks from a military weakened by the abuse of its most valuable resource — its soldiers.
There are many cases in Russia’s proud history when the military turned a disaster into a victory by sheer will and hard work. That is what is needed here, on the part of the whole country. But, you don’t need an American to tell you that.
BG (ret) Kevin Ryan is a former Defense Attaché toMoscowand currently works as a Senior Fellow at theBelfer Centerfor Science and International Affairs, Harvard’sJohn F. Kennedy Schoolof Government
Want to Read More?
The full text of this publication is available via the original publication source.- Recommended
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Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security
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Discussion Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
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