Beyond Implementation Day: Transparency and Enforcement for the Long Term

Implementation Day marked the beginning of the true test of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are now embarking on the long walk towards Transition Day – the date by which the IAEA is supposed to confirm that Iran is not engaged in any undeclared nuclear activities and that all of its nuclear materials are for peaceful use. In eight years, the IAEA is supposed to complete the verification of the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations on nuclear material and facilities.

The JCPOA negotiators are arguing that the agreement will reduce tensions and prevent regional nuclear proliferation because, they contend, it is based on full transparency, intrusive verification, and vigilant enforcement. The IAEA’s report on 16 January acknowledged that Iran has met the key, initial parameters stipulated under the JCPOA, thereby paving the way for Implementation Day. However, the report does not provide a full picture of Tehran’s current nuclear material inventories, nor does it explain how Iran met the JCPOA requirements.

To aid in verification efforts and to reinforce the transparency of the deal, substantially more detailed reports are needed, which are explained in detail in this report.

The success of the JCPOA in containing Iran’s nuclear capabilities depends on full transparency and vigorous verification and monitoring. This approach has its risks, since Iran remains a nuclear-threshold state that threatens regional and international security. While the JCPOA caps Tehran’s nuclear capabilities in the early years, the deal may, over the long term, contribute to a proliferation cascade that will make the world’s most volatile region all the more combustible.