William Tobey, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes in Foreign Policy that it is crucial that the United States and the P5+1 press Iran on the Past Military Dimensions (PMD) of its nuclear program before any final agreement is completed. He argues that while the U.S. originally stated that PMD issues would be resolved before a final agreement, recent remarks by Secretary of State John Kerry have seemed to indicate that the U.S. is walking back its insistence on clarifying the the PMD of Iran's program. This is a mistake, he writes, because American, IAEA, and other national intelligence agencies do not know the entirety of Iran's past work, because understanding the PMD of the Iranian program is necessary for monitoring and verification in any deal, and because compliance with resolving the PMD issue serves as a litmus test for Iranian compliance with a broader agreement. He concludes that a failure to resolve the PMD question will fatally weaken any nuclear accord with Iran.

Gary Samore, Director of Research at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes in Time that the emerging nuclear agreement with Iran, while not perfect, buys needed time for the United States and its allies to continue to manage the potential threat of a nuclear Iran. He notes that the agreement will severely restrict any Iranian attempt to build a nuclear weapon through enriching plutonium, as it mandates modification of the Arak Nuclear facility and bans the construction of a nuclear reprocessing facility, which would be necessary for extracting plutonium from used fuel rods. However, the agreement does leave Iran with a much more robust uranium enrichment program, with restrictions for ten years which are steadily eased between fifteen and twenty-five years after the agreement is signed. He suggests that while it may be possible to get a better deal with tougher negotiating tactics, the United States will not be able to keep international consensus pressuring Iran if it rejects the deal after Iran appears to agree to it. He concludes that while this does not solve the problem of the Iranian nuclear program, it gives the United States time to check Iranian regional designs, encourage political change in Iran, and seek other ways to change the regime's calculus about nuclear weapons.

Aaron Arnold, Associate of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes that while Iran may receive sanctions relief as part of a final nuclear deal, it needs to take actions to strengthen its financial laws and regulations in order for it to truly be integrated into the global economy. He argues that Iranian financial laws, specifically those relating to money-laundering, terrorism financing, and proliferation financing, remain weak and do not meet the standard of the international financial community. These legal weaknesses have caused Iran to remain designated by the U.S. Treasury as a "jurisdiction of primary money-laundering concern," making it much harder for the Iranian financial sector to operate using American currency or the American financial system, which, despite recent developments such as the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, maintains the dominant role in global finance. He concludes that without these reforms to Iran's banking sector, its benefits from the ending of sanctions will be much smaller than desired by Iranian policymakers.

Daniel Sobelman, research fellow with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes in Foreign Policy that the Houthi rebels in Yemen are following a similar operational strategy to the one pursued by Hezbollah during its 2006 war with Israel. He argues that the Houthis share operational links with Hezbollah. These links between the organizations can be best discerned by analyzing the rhetoric of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, who has stated that Hezbollah's fight against Israel in 2006 provides a model for organizations and groups operating against militarily superior forces. In this model, the actions of the Houthis to attack Saudi border towns and garrisons are part of a broader strategy of forcing Saudi Arabia to deescalate its air campaign or force it to engage with ground forces, an outcome that would favor the Houthis. He concludes that while it is impossible to know what the exact effects of the Houthi retaliatory measures against Saudi targets, it is clear that more than air power will needed to end the Houthi threat to Saudi Arabia.

Iranian military leaders denied that international inspectors would have access to military sites, an Israeli military source assessed that the threat of Iran may be “in decline,” and more in this week’s Belfer Iran Brief, covering May 25-June 10, 2015.

William Tobey, senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, participated in a panel hosted by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. The panel concluded that a final deal with Iran will require a full declaration of nuclear related activities undertaken by Iran in order to determine the inspection measures necessary to monitor the Iranian program. It also stated that an agreement should provide a mechanism for reporting violations and managing disputes, and authorizing challenge inspections of sites in Iran. The panel also suggested that verification will need to be augmented by national intelligence capacities, be conducted by expert personnel with the latest equipment, and monitor the importation of dual-use technology items. The panel concluded that over time the rigor of inspections will probably decline, and so it is important to remain vigilant and prevent “inspections fatigue."

William Tobey, senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, participated in a panel hosted by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. The panel concluded that a final deal with Iran will require a full declaration of nuclear related activities undertaken by Iran in order to determine the inspection measures necessary to monitor the Iranian program. It also stated that an agreement should provide a mechanism for reporting violations and managing disputes, and authorizing challenge inspections of sites in Iran. The panel also suggested that verification will need to be augmented by national intelligence capacities, be conducted by expert personnel with the latest equipment, and monitor the importation of dual-use technology items. The panel concluded that over time the rigor of inspections will probably decline, and so it is important to remain vigilant and prevent “inspections fatigue."

Gene Gerzhoy, Research Fellow with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, writes in the Washington Post that history demonstrates that the United States has many options for both pursuing diplomacy with adversaries while preventing nervous allies from seeking nuclear deterrents of their own, a dilemma the U.S. faces now in its relations with Saudi Arabia over the nuclear negotiations with Iran. He argues that in the 1960s the United States was able to use coercive diplomacy to pressure West Germany to not pursue nuclear weapons by threatening to withdraw American troops helping defend West Germany from the Soviet Union. He suggests that the U.S. could use a combination of coercive pressure and security reassurances to prevent Saudi Arabia from acquiring nuclear capabilities after the signing of a nuclear deal with Iran.

Payam Mohseni, Director of the Iran Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Dennis Ross, International Council Member, Belfer Center, and David Sanger, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center, discuss for The New York Times the stakes in the current Iran nuclear negotiations, including the risks of lifting sanctions on Iran, the difficulties in reaching an agreement, and the importance of the current political moment for both Iran and the U.S. in reaching a deal.

Aaron Arnold, Associate with the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center, and Nikos Passas, Professor of Criminal Justice at Northeastern University, argue in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that an important, and generally overlooked, aspect of any deal with Iran is the role of banks and financial institutions in monitoring proliferation related transactions and keeping Iran from cheating on the agreement. They point out that banks are necessary for the monitoring and verification of a nuclear agreement because they provide the information used by sanctions enforcers to track illicit proliferation financing. At this point, several holes exist in detecting proliferation financing, including the lack of a clear template for banks and regulatory agencies to be searching for, and the lack of binding regulations for all forms of financial institutions, such as money remitters. They suggest that the Iranian nuclear deal offers a chance for these systematic holes to be plugged by centralizing analysis of data for proliferation financing and seeking reforms in the Iranian financial system.