Iran's Evolving Nuclear Narrative

In March 2012, during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency, I wrote a piece for RUSI where I discussed the Iranian leadership's nuclear narrative. Almost two years have now passed, and Iranians have elected a new moderate president, Hassan Rouhani, who has attempted to engage the international community, especially the West, to solve the costly issue of the country's nuclear program. Here, I discuss the commonalities and differences in nuclear rhetoric at home and abroad under the Rouhani and Ahmadinejad
administrations.

Parallel narratives in Tehran

Tehran's nuclear narrative has always been fashioned around two distinct, yet intertwined themes: religion and nationalism. While these two have remained constant, the degree to which Iranian officials emphasize one or the other varies depending on the audience targeted; the present conditions in the domestic, regional, and international spheres; and power dynamics both at home and abroad. Generally, however, the religious discourse is aimed at domestic regime supporters, the West, and the Muslim world, while the nationalist discourse is aimed at the rest of the Iranian population, the Non-Aligned Movement (outside the Muslim world), and, again, the West. The West is unsurprisingly the target audience for much of Iran's nuclear rhetoric, as its role is key in determining the fate of Iran's nuclear program.

The balance between the two narratives has long been in flux. Nationalism was viewed as a taboo in the years following the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Its founder, Ayatollah Khomeini, was inherently opposed to nationalism, which he viewed as a product and vehicle of imperialism. As a result, it took time for nationalism to supplant religion as the dominant theme in Iran's national (and nuclear) discourse. Indeed, the growing popularity of pre-Islamic Persian symbolism, the anti-pan-Islamic and pro-nationalism slogans of the 2009 presidential electoral campaigns, and the subsequent Green Movement are manifestations of Tehran's failure to mobilize Iranians under the banner of Islam. Despite the government's efforts to undermine Iran's pre-Islamic legacy by removing 2,500 years of Persian kingship from history textbooks, young Iranians remain interested in their heritage: they visit the ruins of Persepolis and wear jewelry and clothing with Zoroastrian symbolism or verses of 10th century poet Ferdowsi's great national epic, The Book of Kings.

In recent years, realizing that condemning nationalism in favor of a religious alternative is not sustainable in a country where the concept of nationhood holds 2,000 year roots, Iran's leadership has had to change and adjust its discourse. Religious rhetoric certainly still appeals to certain Iranian factions, but a big fraction of the country's population values its national identity over its religious one. Recognizing this, President Ahmadinejad and his circle highlighted nationalism in their rhetoric, especially in the context of the nuclear program. Under Ahmadinejad's administration, Ferdowsi's poetry found its way into government-sponsored TV sets, websites, and posters promoting the country's nuclear program.

Despite this, Rouhani and his team continue to use religious discourse in their international discussions on the nuclear dossier. The religious discourse has been predominantly legal. It has been mainly fashioned around the idea of the "fatwa" issued by the Supreme Leader on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. This discourse is utilized as a "limiting factor," which allows Iran to communicate its peaceful intentions. The main goal of the religious discourse has been to convince a non-domestic audience that the nuclear program is merely for peaceful purposes. Rouhani has referred to the "Supreme Leader's fatwa" a number of times, stating that the fatwa, which Rouhani has said he values more than the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, prohibits nuclear weapons.

Domestically, however, the nuclear program today is sold to Iranians as indigenous technological progress, made by the nation's scientists despite Western propaganda and sanctions. The program, unlike Pakistan's "Islamic Bomb"—which was presented as aiming to put the Muslim world "on par with the Hindu, Christian, and Jewish civilizations"—is not presented as pan-Islamic. The nuclear program is certainly presented as an element of pride for all Muslims, but at the end of the day, it is sold as an Iranian national program, by the Iranian nation (overcoming Western and Israeli sanctions and sabotage), for the Iranian nation. In Ahmadinejad's words, "they [the West] saw that the Iranian nation can [pursue its nuclear program despite sanctions and external pressure] and this ability is in the nation's essence."

Nationalism refined

The nationalist narrative has also undergone a change over the years. The long-held view that the West is a primary "enemy" constituted a major part of Ahmadinejad's rhetoric. The idea of the Western enemy has been a key plank of Iran's revolutionary narrative since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, strengthened by the Security Council's failure to condemn Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq War. It is based on the idea that several states (distinguished from the people of those countries) are the enemies of the Islamic regime and the Iranian people. What is more, these "arrogant powers" are the enemy of Muslims and other developing countries. These powers, Tehran has argued, shape international law and its supporting institutions. This is why these laws and institutions are inherently biased.

Rouhani has toned down this narrative by taking a number of steps. First, Rouhani tried to retract his predecessor's Holocaust denial by condemning all the crimes committed by the Nazis. Second, he canceled Ahmadinejad's initiative to host a yearly anti-Zionism conference in Tehran. Third, both Rouhani and Zarif have tried to speak directly to the American people through various U.S. media outlets. Rouhani, for instance, directly addressed the American public in the opening of his interview with CNN's Christiane Amanpour at the beginning of his presidency. Zarif spoke to people, rather than governments, in a video his team posted on YouTube in November 2013. Toning down the narrative, without completely stopping it, is part of Rouhani's goal of being constructive and engaging the West, while keeping the hardliners at home satisfied. It is toward those hardliners that Rouhani directs a large portion of his nationalist rhetoric. Like his predecessor, Rouhani highlights the nationalist discourse, fashioned around the idea of indigenous technological progress. In a recent interview with CNN's Fareed Zakaria, the President stated that for the Iranian nation, nuclear technology is part of national pride, and the people are very sensitive to it.

Conclusions

Several conclusions can be drawn from these changes. First, the overall tone of Rouhani and his team is different from that of Ahmadinejad. Rouhani criticized in his memoirs "the abundance of slogans" in Iran's politics, and his tone as president reflects his ambition to address that aspect of post-revolutionary political culture. Second, Rouhani and Zarif have been trying to "fix" relationships that their predecessors had broken by their belligerent rhetoric. This task is especially difficult given their need to satisfy hardliners at home while trying to engage the West in a constructive manner. These "fixes" include a rollback of the "enemy." Third, the religious discourse has been toned down in recent months, perhaps to be replaced with "more concrete" talking points in an effort to find a solution. Lastly, the nationalist discourse has remained constant. Rouhani and his team understand that in order to keep the Iranian people on board and to affirm the country's rights, nationalism is their best tool. As the interim deal implemented and the P5+1 and Iran move onto the next stages of negotiations, it is crucial for the West to recognize these changes in Tehran's rhetoric and appreciate the difficult task Rouhani and his team are facing: satisfying two groups of hardliners with two opposing agendas, while remaining constructive. Allowing Western hardliners to undermine Rouhani's efforts would translate into empowering Iranian hardliners, which in turn could "kill" the possibility of any deal on the nuclear dossier, with potentially catastrophic consequences.

Ariane Tabatabai is an Iranian Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, a PhD candidate in the Department of War Studies, King's College London, and a non-resident Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.