Putin Should Make Assad an Offer He Can’t Refuse

To hear some Russia watchers say it, Vladimir Putin will fight to the last Russian air bomb to keep Bashar al-Assad of Syria in power. But will he?

I argue not only that Putin could and should let Assad go, but also that Putin’s own record of behind-the-door diplomacy offers a clue as to how the Syrian dictator could step aside without losing face.

When it became clear that George Bush Jr and his coalition of the willing were going to invade Iraq, Putin sent Yevgeny Primakov, one of Russia’s savviest statesmen, to Bagdad to make an offer to Saddam Al-Hussein: resign from presidency, but stay on as leader of the Baath party. Saddam refused the offer and the rest is history.

It happens that Assad, too, is not only president of Syria but also leader of his own Baath party. And Putin has much more leverage over Assad now than he did over Saddam before the second Iraq war. So perhaps Assad would pay more attention if Putin were to make such an offer now.

There are several reasons why Putin would want to do so. The most important requires an understanding of the very serious threat that a persistence of the Islamic State (Isis) and al-Qaeda in Syria would pose to Russia’s national security.

Although criticized for lacking a long-term strategy in Syria, Putin is not so short-sighted as to fail to see that restoration of the status quo ante in Syria is impossible. No matter how much land Assad’s armed forces may regain with Russia’s air support – they have lost control of five sixths of the national territory so far – the Syrian state stands little chance of survival in its official borders if Assad stays in power. Alawites constitute less than 15 per cent of the Syrian population and they cannot realistically impose their will on the Sunni majority.

Putin realizes that either Assad’s government will be replaced by a coalition, in which all major religious and ethnic groups including Sunnis, Alawites, Kurds, Christians and other minorities are represented, or there is a good chance that the bad guys from Al-Qaeda and Isis, who outnumber and outgun the moderate opposition, will prevail and take over most of Syria.

In pre-9/11 Afghanistan, the Taliban hosted Al-Qaeda. In Syria it may get to the point at which Al-Qaeda and Isis will play the hosts. Russia cannot put up with the reality of these organisations permanently controlling all of Syria or any part of it, given that Isis has proclaimed a ‘province’ in Russia’s North Caucasus, attracted more than 2,000 Russian nationals to its ranks and, most recently, claims to have downed a Russian airliner over Sinai.

Al-Qaeda, which has long maintained ties to violent groups in the North Caucasus, has also vowed to attack Russia. Both Al-Qaeda and Isis have shown practical interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

In my view, prevention of the complete failure of the Syrian state, which would turn it into a long-term haven for militant Islamists who have vowed to attack Russia, constitutes the primary Russian national interest at stake in Syria. Other interests are as follows:

• Maintaining Russia’s military presence in Syria, including the naval facility at Tartus, to ensure, among other things, the permanent presence of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean Sea, something that Russia’s new Maritime Doctrine explicitly calls for.
• Preserving access of Russian companies to Syria’s market to ensure that the country continues to buy Russian-made arms and machinery, ensuring at least some degree of diversification of Russia’s economy, largely driven by the oil and gas sectors.
• Ensuring that Russia’s reputation as a reliable protector of its allies (in the eyes of the latter) is not damaged by a forceful removal of Assad from power.

In addition to these national interests, members of Russia’s ruling elite have a collective interest in the prevention of forceful regime change or any kind of revolution, as they fear such events could become precedents for other countries, including Russia.

Assad has served all these interests rather well but he cannot serve them much longer. It is almost certain that he won’t re-establish control over all of Syria and there is a very good chance he will lose what territory he controls at the moment. Russia can live with a Syria without Assad, as long as his successor is chosen through negotiations in which the Kremlin has a say, followed by elections, rather than through use of force, and provided the new leadership honours Russia’s aforementioned interests.

There have been multiple signs that Russian leaders no longer think their country’s interests in the Middle East hinge on Assad’s presidency and that they are prepared for a transition to a representative coalition government in Syria.

When asked on October 17 whether Syria’s next government must be headed by Assad, Russian premier Dmitry Medvedev replied “No, absolutely not”. Putin summoned Assad to Moscow on October 20 to secure his consent not only to hold early elections in Syria, but also to allow Russian warplanes to provide air support for moderate rebels. The two also discussed what Putin defined as a “long-term settlement based on a political process that involves all political forces, ethnic and religious groups”.

Isis and al-Qaeda do not pose a threat to Russia alone. The US, the European Union and their allies in the Middle East cannot live with a partitioned Syria if any parts of it are controlled by Isis and/or Al-Qaeda. Isis counts in its ranks some 4,500 nationals of western countries, including up to 700 Britons. FBI director James Comey has recently been quoted as saying that Isis poses the greatest danger to the US homeland. Isis has also been reported to have planned attacks in Europe and some of its followers have succeeded in their plans.

Even if Isis posed no significant threat to Russia or to western countries, it should still be their obligation before the international community to battle it. A violent organisation whose members bury opponents alive, rape children and kill people on a massive scale just because they practice a different form of Islam, let alone other religions, constitutes a pure evil that Russia, the US, the EU and their allies are obliged to fight. Dismantling of Isis should supersede any past political acrimony between western countries and Russia as well as any short-term expediencies of domestic politics.

The agreements on Syria’s chemical weapons and Iran’s nuclear programme have demonstrated that Russian and western countries can negotiate win-win solutions on issues of high importance not only for themselves but also for the entire international community. It is my hope that recently revived diplomatic efforts, involving these countries, their allies and Iran, will enable the emergence of a representative and responsible government in Syria, while the likes of Isis and al-Qaeda will be defeated not only in Syria but also in Iraq.