Q & A with Gary Samore

Gary Samore is the executive director for research at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Prior to that, he served for four years as President Obama’s White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction, including as U.S. Sherpa for the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC and the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, Korea. We asked him for about prospects for breakthroughs with Iran and Syria, and his goals for the Belfer Center.

Suddenly it feels as if there is a chance for progress on Iran’s nuclear program, with a new Iranian president who is more open to dialogue. How do you assess chances for a breakthrough?

We have the best chance for a nuclear deal we’ve had in years because the economic sanctions are putting tremendous pressure on Iran and the new Iranian President Rouhani was elected with a mandate to improve the economy by lifting sanctions, which means coming to an agreement with the U.S. on the nuclear issue.  However, the U.S. and Iran are very far apart on the terms of a comprehensive agreement.  In particular, Iran has not offered to accept the kind of far-reaching limits on its nuclear activities and international monitoring that the U.S. will demand as a condition for lifting the most significant sanctions.  Therefore, I think it’s unlikely we’ll see a breakthrough in the near future on a comprehensive agreement.

Nonetheless, the two sides may be able to agree on interim measures that would impose some limits on nuclear activities in exchange for some easing of sanctions, while setting a deadline for negotiating a final agreement.  The critical thing for the U.S. in any interim agreement is to maintain the existing sanctions on Iranian finances and oil exports because we’ll need the leverage in the endgame negotiations, which will be very difficult.

The Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons almost triggered a U.S. military strike. Does the U.S.-Russia agreement open a new path toward eliminating chemical weapons? If this works, can it set a precedent?

The agreement to eliminate Syria’s chemical weapons appears to be working, despite the security complications presented by the civil war.  Inspectors from the OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) have inspected nearly all the facilities declared by the Syrian government, they’ve completed destruction of production, mixing and filling equipment and seem to be on track to dispose or remove the agents and precursors themselves by the mid-2014 deadline.  Of course, there are still many things that could go wrong, but so far so good. Assuming the agreement is successfully completed, I think it will help reinforce U.S. and Russian cooperation to deal with the Iranian nuclear issue where both Moscow and Washington have a common interest in achieving a negotiated agreement that avoids war and prevents Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

If the WMD threat is eliminated, should the United States still stay involved in the Syrian conflict by arming the rebels?

Even if Syria’s chemical weapons are eliminated, it doesn’t solve the underlying problem of Syria’s civil war, which seems likely to continue for years, notwithstanding U.S. and Russian efforts to arrange a peaceful settlement.  At the same time, President Obama is determined to stay out the Syrian civil war as much as possible.  We may provide some very limited training and arming of the Syrian opposition, but probably not enough to make a significance difference on the battlefield.   If other countries in the region want to provide military assistance to the opposition, they are going to have to take the lead themselves.

The Belfer Center has played a role in preparing for both previous nuclear summits, which you organized for the White House. How can the Belfer Center play a role in the upcoming summit in the Hague in the spring?

Several of us – Graham Allison, Will Tobey, Matt Bunn, Ollie Heinonen, and myself – have been working directly with the Dutch hosts and other governments to help prepare for the March 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague.  For example, Matt and Will recently presented a briefing at the UN on the threat of nuclear terrorism.  We’ve also worked directly with the IAEA on how it can strengthen its programs to assist members with nuclear security.  At the summit itself, we’ll be participating in the so-called “Knowledge Summit” of outside experts and NGOs seeking to increase public awareness and support for stronger measures to prevent nuclear terrorism, and Belfer has established a special website on the Nuclear Security Summit for people who are interested in learning more about this issue.

As Executive Director for Research here, what plans do you have to grow the center’s research output, and what areas need strengthening?

We’ve been very fortunate to add some great new Senior Fellows to the Belfer roster – Tom Donilon, Michael Morell, General Petraus, Ambassador Bosworth – which will strengthen our teaching and research.  I’d like to see the center expand its work in two areas.  First, we can do more on Asia, including U.S.-China relations and managing security issues on the Korean peninsula.  Second, I see cyber as an important growth area for Belfer, where we can bring together the same kind of synthesis of policy expertise and technological expertise that we’ve done for nuclear issues.