Why There Won’t Be a People’s Republic of Left-Bank Ukraine Just Yet

Evidence of recently resumed movements of Russian troops in the vicinity of Russia’s border with Ukraine (as well as farther afield) have reignited the debate about Kremlin intentions to order another military intervention on its neighbor’s territory, with some Western Russia watchers warning that a Russian invasion could be “imminent.”

Renowned Western analysts who believe an invasion is increasingly probable include Andrew Weiss and Eugene Rumer of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace whose nuanced commentary has made waves in the Transatlantic community of Russia watchers: “A careful review of the Russian leader’s record with respect to Ukraine suggests that almost all of the requisite components and justifications for military intervention are either in—or moving into—place,” they wrote earlier this month. Putin “is thinking about his legacy” and the “one major piece of unfinished business that is still missing from Putin’s roster of accomplishments ... is the restoration of Russia’s dominion over key parts of its historic empire,” none “more important—or more pivotal—than … Ukraine.” The two Carnegie Endowement experts argue that Putin has a “tendency to act emotionally and to lash out precipitously in ways that don’t always make ‘sense’ to outside observers” relying on cost-benefit analysis to try to divine the Russian leader’s actions. Putin’s “patience with Kyiv is running out,” they warn. Melinda Haring of the Atlantic Council concurs. In her Foreign Affairs piece, Haring lists Putin’s desire to ensure a great legacy and his loss of patience with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy among the factors suggesting “that Putin will strike Ukraine again, and soon” (underscore mine).

While I agree with the proposition that Putin cares about the impact of major foreign policy decisions on his legacy,1 I disagree with the idea that Putin would let emotions prevail in a decision about sending troops to Ukraine. In fact, my research on Putin’s past choices about possible military interventions indicates that his decisions to send troops to foreign countries have been rational rather than emotional, shaped by a confluence of three conditions. First, Putin had to be directly motivated by a clear, acute threat to one or more of Russia’s vital national interests as he and his team see them (or a clear opportunity to advance some of these interests). Second, he had to have a reasonable hope that military intervention would succeed in warding off this threat. Third, he had either to have run out of non-military (i.e., less costly) options of responding to the threat or to lack the time needed to exercise such options due to the threat’s urgency.