Policy Briefs & Testimonies

461 Items

Ethanol refinery with carbon capture equipment

AP Photo/Stephen Groves

Policy Brief

Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage: Technologies and Costs in the U.S. Context

| January 2022

Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) is very likely to be a key technology for achieving the Biden administration's goal of net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. But absent regulation requiring its use, CCUS needs to become more economical in order for deployment in the United States to expand significantly.

Dominion Energy's 12 megawatt pilot project near Virginia Beach

AP/Michael Dwyer

Policy Brief

Offshore Wind in the Eastern United States

| December 2021

If wind is to play a significant role in decarbonizing the electricity sector in the densely populated northeast section of the United States, a substantial proportion of the investment must occur offshore, as onshore wind speeds and available land area are limited. Investing in offshore wind could lead to significant economic and environmental benefits, but significant barriers to achieving these benefits remain.

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House Democracy Partnership Commission Hearing

| Dec. 01, 2021

The House Democracy Partnership Commission held a hearing on the role of independent and constituent-driven legislatures and the importance of legislative strengthening efforts. Parliaments have a key role to play in promoting and advancing good governance, the sharing of best practices, and collaborating with their peers. Bodies such as the House Democracy Partnership can be formidable tools for parliaments to engage with one other and become valuable fora for strengthening democratic institutions and deepening bilateral relations.

Photo of a car with Hydrogen Fuel written on the side.

Photo by David Zalubowski/AP

Policy Brief

The European Union at a Crossroads: Unlocking Renewable Hydrogen’s Potential

| November 2021

The European Union (EU) is highly competitive in clean technologies manufacturing and thus well-positioned to benefit from the emergence of global hydrogen markets. But a narrow focus on short-term cost considerations could drive member states to implement national roadmaps with little or no coordination among themselves and hence little or no chance of competing globally.

Policy Brief

The Role of Blockchain in Green Hydrogen Value Chains

| November 2021

As energy systems increasingly evolve from centralized to decentralized, from “grey” to “green,” stakeholders will need to efficiently account for and track emissions and green molecules in a transparent, secure, and standardized way, and must be able to do so along value chains from production to consumption.

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Policy Brief - Migration Policy Institute

Migration Management and Border Security: Lessons Learned

| September 2021

Two decades into the 21st century, both the European Union and the United States have faced considerable challenges in managing migration and borders. Globally, the number of international migrants has grown considerably, reaching 281 million as of 2020. And large-scale irregular migration has strained the infrastructure, legal systems, and often the social and political fabric of the nations encountering it. This personal reflection, written by a former high-ranking official in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, examines the strategic lessons that can be learned from recent migration events that have severely stressed border authorities in North America and Europe.

Ambassador Nick Burns at his Senate hearing on October 20, 2021

REUTERS/Elizabeth Frantz


Statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Nicholas Burns, U.S. Ambassadorial Nominee to the People’s Republic of China

| Oct. 20, 2021

If confirmed, I look forward to returning to public service and the State Department, where I have spent the bulk of my career in Administrations of both parties. I would be honored to lead our team at the U.S. Mission in China, which is on the front lines of this complicated and consequential relationship.

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Policy Brief

Why Russia Is Unlikely to Use Zapad-2021 to Intervene Militarily in European Countries

| Aug. 31, 2021

The last time Russia and Belarus teamed up to hold a large-scale strategic command-and-staff military exercise, a number of international media outlets pondered whether it might be a prelude to war. Less than two months before Zapad-2017 (“West-2017”), The New York Timesproclaimed that the drills near NATO’s borders had raised “fears of aggression,” and a CNN contributor wondered, “Could they turn into war?” Ukraine’s then-defense minister cautioned that Zapad could be a ruse to attack any European country that shares a border with Russia. None of these scenarios materialized. Since then, the Russian General Staff has held three comparable sets of drills annually in the geographical areas of Vostok (“East”) in 2018, Tsentr (“Center”) in 2019, and Kavkaz (“Caucasus”) in 2020.

It is now time for Russia to hold exercises in its western regions again, and we hear warnings that Moscow will use it as cover for the start of aggression against another country—although such warnings are not as numerous as in 2017. For instance, the Ukrainian leadership is considering as many as nine scenarios of  “aggravation of the situation around Ukraine” as a result of Zapad-2021, according to Alexey Arestovich, a member of Ukraine’s delegation at the Trilateral Contact Group on Donbas. One of the scenarios, Arestovich said, involves an “invasion by an attack grouping formed in the course of Zapad-2021 in the direction of Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv.” In addition, Russia watchers such as former Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili and the American Enterprise Institute’s Leon Aron have recently speculated that Russia could either annex Belarus or use the territory of that country to execute an intervention in one of the Baltic states. I would argue, however, that it is unlikely—though not impossible—that President Vladimir Putin would use Zapad-2021, the main phase of which is to take place September 10-16, to either absorb Belarus or intervene in a state that borders either Russia or Belarus (or both).