International Security

"...[A]ssessing the bioterrorism threat coming from the life sciences requires a broad range of expertise and information. A better analysis of such threats would involve relevant analysts within the intelligence community engaging with a range of social science experts. Such experts could provide information about terrorist intentions, motivations, and capabilities, as well as a more nuanced understanding of the difficulties involved in replicating scientific experiments and utilizing them for terrorist purposes."

A study of the 2011 controversy surrounding publication of Ron Fouchier and Yoshihiro Kawaoka's H5N1 avian influenza experiments reveals that U.S. intelligence analysts do not have adequate resources to evaluate dual-use scientific experiments, or to navigate the politics that characterize the use of technical expertise in biosecurity issues.

International Securityis America’s leading journal of security affairs. It provides sophisticated analyses of contemporary security issues and discusses their conceptual and historical foundations. The journal is edited at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center and published quarterly by the MIT Press. Questions may be directed to IS@Harvard.edu.

"NFU would provide the United States with important political benefits in its efforts to lead the nonproliferation regime and encourage greater international support for nonproliferation initiatives. Many nonnuclear member states of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) often base their lack of support for U.S.-led multilateral nonproliferation initiatives on the grounds that the United States has not done enough to fulfill its obligation to Article 6 of the NPT, which commits the declared nuclear states to disarmament."

The risks posed by biological threats are increasing, and biosecurity has risen higher on the international security agenda. Yet the lack of a common definition of biosecurity, the range of biological threats, and differences of opinion over the most important threats hinder the development of effective bioterrorism counterstrategies. A definition that includes naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate disease outbreaks, combined with a taxonomy of threats that identifies the sources of and groups at risk for biological threats, would help policymakers assess and manage these risks, prevent and respond to biological threats, and further biosecurity research.

Koblentz examines the role of biological weapons on four other key areas of concern: proliferation, deterrence, civil-military relations, and threat assessment. Koblentz looks at the influence of secrecy in all four areas and offers the following insight: not only does secrecy hinder verification; it also weakens deterrence, impedes civilian oversight, and complicates threat assessments.

Contrary to those who argue that economic globalization increases vulnerability to a bioterrorist threat—and for this reason should be restricted—Hoyt and Brooks contend that globalization is a “double-edged sword” that has the potential to increase but also decrease levels of vulnerability—for example, by facilitating the development of vaccines.

Sensing an urgent need to take action in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States government passed the U.S.A. Patriot Act, which according to Jessica Stern, “precluded careful balancing of competing interests."

Peacekeeping and peacemaking in these places, although engaging important humanitarian concerns, never addressed the vital security interests of the United States, and none of these conflicts could begin to threaten its survival.