International Security

This analysis suggests that the United States will continue to face difficult trade-offs in its Taiwan Strait policy. On the one hand, the United States should not—as some prominent analysts have suggested—scale back its commitment to Taiwan. Such a change in U.S. policy would accelerate the shifting balance of power in the strait, thereby magnifying the risk of armed conflict between the PRC and Taiwan. On the other hand, Washington must continue to tread cautiously on the Taiwan issue. The fact remains that many in China care deeply about Taiwan.

Does economic interdependence promote peace or war between states? In Economic Interdependence and War, Dale Copeland argues that the answer depends on states’ expectations of future trade and their assessments of whether interdependence will benefit them or make them vulnerable. Snyder reviews the book and considers the historical relationship between trade expectations and conflict.

Conventional accounts of the United States’ 1972 Linebacker I and Linebacker II deep air interdiction campaigns portray them as crucial to stopping the North Vietnamese Army’s Easter Offensive and convincing North Vietnam to sign the Paris peace accords. In fact, however, U.S. close air support and battlefield air interdiction contributed far more to achieving these outcomes than did the Linebacker campaigns.

Many international peacebuilders have suggested that integrating opposing combatants into a national military after civil war helps prevent conflict from recurring. Analysis of eleven cases of post–civil war military integration, however, reveals little evidence to support this claim. Underlying political conditions, not military integration, determine whether peace endures.

Since 2008, tensions between China and Taiwan have decreased significantly. Is the risk of cross-strait conflict likely to remain low? There are reasons for optimism: economic ties between the two states are increasing; China’s growing military strength is still offset by the U.S. commitment to Taiwan; and Taiwanese remain pragmatic regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty.

Charles L. Glaser, Andrew H. Kydd, Mark. L. Haas, and John M. Owen IV respond to Sebastian Rosato's winter 2014/15 article, "The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers."

Fears that China will soon displace the United States as the international system’s superpower are unwarranted. Unlike previous rising powers challenging leading states, China’s technological and military capabilities are much lower relative to those of the United States. Further, converting economic power into military might is far more difficult than it was in the past. Scholars and analysts need to go beyond the concepts of unipolarity and bipolarity and engage in fine-grained analysis of the distribution of power.

China's continuing commitment to a nuclear strategy of assured retaliation indicates that it will prioritize avoiding a nuclear arms race with the United States. Nevertheless, leaders and militaries in both countries will need to be exceptionally careful to avoid nuclear escalation in a crisis.

Mark S. Bell's summer 2015 International Security article, "Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy," is one of two co-winners of the 2016 Patricia Weitsman Award for Outstanding International Security Studies Section Graduate Paper. The paper proffers a new a typology that innovatively delineates the ways in which the acquisition of nuclear weapons can alter the foreign policy behavior of current and future nuclear states.

Ronan Tse-min Fu, David James Gill, and Eric Hundman respond to Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry's fall 2014 article, "Racing toward Tragedy? China's Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma."