International Security

Most policymakers and international relations scholars believe that prestige enhances states’ authority and that states therefore seek prestige. This belief is wrong. Policymakers rely on their feelings of pride and shame about their state to evaluate its prestige rather than analyzing other states’ views. Further, policymakers discount other states’ prestige. States should therefore avoid costly policies designed to enhance their prestige. Evidence from the South African (Boer) War supports these findings.

When do states carry out mass violence against minority ethnic groups collaborating with adversaries during wartime? A comparison of the policies of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian Empires during World War I shows that states with influential political organizations reflecting non-ethnic social divisions are less likely to pursue mass killings of ethnic minority collaborators. This factor may also help prevent mass killing in contemporary ethnic conflicts.

Andrew S. Erickson; Evan Braden Montgomery; and Craig Neuman respond to Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich's Summer 2016 article, "Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia."

Vipin Narang explains how states choose among four possible strategies for developing nuclear weapons.

Joseph S. Nye explains how states can deter or dissuade adversaries in cyberspace.
 

This policy brief is based on “What Is the Cyber Offense-Defense Balance? Concepts, Causes, and Assessment,” which appears in the winter 2016/17 issue of International Security.

Many commentators claim that rising nationalism in China has pushed the Chinese leadership toward aggressive foreign policy stances. Responses to the Beijing Area Study survey from 1998 to 2015, however, suggest that popular nationalism is not increasing. China’s more bellicose behaviors can be better explained by factors such as elite opinion, leaders’ preferences, security dilemma dynamics, and organizational interests.

Does cyberspace favor the offense, as many analysts and policymakers claim? Three factors undermine any cyber offensive advantage, as demonstrated in a cost-benefit analysis of the Stuxnet operation against Iran. First, any measurement of the offense-defense balance must consider a cyber operation’s value as well as its cost to both sides. Second, organizational capabilities play a significant role in determining the balance. Third, offensive advantages decline when attackers target physical infrastructure rather than information networks.

Understanding which nuclear proliferation strategies are available to states and how to thwart them is crucial for global security. Analysis of the strategies chosen by potential proliferators, and particularly the history of India’s nuclear program, shows how states choose among four possible proliferation strategies: hedging, sprinting, hiding, and sheltered pursuit. Each strategy has vulnerabilities that can be exploited to prevent proliferation.

Comparing Israel and Hezbollah’s interactions before and after the 2006 Lebanon War offers insights into the sources of deterrence stability. Since 2006, Israel and Hezbollah have learned to apply rational deterrence theory. Careful communication of capabilities and resolve has contributed to a decade without war. This history also illustrates how a weak actor can deter a stronger adversary by minimizing its own vulnerability and maximizing that of its opponent.