2748 Items

Defense Secretary Jim Mattis takes his seat for a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee

AP

Analysis & Opinions - Axios

Trump's Nuclear Review Could Trigger a Chain Reaction in Asia

| Feb. 08, 2018

"Just as U.S. nuclear strategy and arsenal expansions affect those of China, China's nuclear shifts affect India's threat perceptions. Pakistan, in turn, pays close attention to any growth in Indian nuclear forces. To avoid a nuclear chain reaction in Asia, Congress should take a stand against proliferation and refuse to fund these new weapons programs."

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Policy Brief

Verifying the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons and Providing Assurance against Breakout

| February 2018

Effective verification will be absolutely essential to achieving nuclear disarmament. Developing effective verification may seem an impossible challenge, but there is substantial experience to build on, including IAEA safeguards and bilateral arms control processes. Examining the specific steps required to progress disarmament, we are not starting with a blank sheet, many verification missions are similar to those existing or under development today. International collaboration in developing new verification applications will contribute to the confidence and trust required to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons.

A poster on a fence in Lahore, Pakistan shows Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, glorified by many of his countrymen but reviled by Western governments.

AP Photo/K.M. Chaudary

Journal Article - Nonproliferation Review

Why Do Entities Get Involved in Proliferation? Exploring the Criminology of Illicit WMD-Related Trade

| Feb. 01, 2018

This article seeks to provide an original approach to weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related illicit trade by drawing on criminology and focusing on the transactional level. Specifically, the article discusses the “rational-choice” model as a way to understand an entity’s involvement in illicit trade, and considers also the limitations of this approach, as well as the role that opportunity plays in an actor’s decision to engage in illicit trade. The article draws the conclusion that the prospects of deterring illicit trade using export controls and related criminal sanctions are limited.

Nov. 23, 2016, a train returns from transporting ballast used in the construction of the Nairobi-Mombasa railway

AP Photo/Ben Curtis

Discussion Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

African Regional Economic Integration

| Winter 2018

The power of Pan-Africanism as a guiding vision for the continent’s development is widely studied, mostly as an aspirational phenomenon. At worst, Pan-Africanism has often been seen as a poor imitation of American federalism or European integration. Both of these perceptions do not reflect the profound nature of the role that the ideology of Pan-Africanism played in shaping the continent’s economic transformation. 

The Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor at the Kalpakkam Nuclear Complex, India.

Kirstie Hansen / IAEA

Paper - Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center

India’s Nuclear Safeguards: Not Fit for Purpose

| January 2018

Currently, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is considering India’s application for membership. In this context NSG members are reportedly discussing membership criteria for states not party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), including a requirement for clear and strict separation of current and future civilian nuclear facilities from non-civilian nuclear facilities. In this paper, John Carlson examines India’s Separation Plan and safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and shows that they do not meet this standard – that current arrangements create an unverified grey zone between military and civilian material, and are not sufficient to verify that India is not using safeguarded material to benefit military purposes.

Report - International Panel on Fissile Materials

China’s Fissile Material Production and Stockpile

| January 2018

China began producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium for nuclear weapons in the 1960s and is believed to have halted production the 1980s. Despite the passage of thirty years there has been no official policy declaration in this regard. This report uses newly available public information from Chinese sources to provide an improved reconstruction of the history of China’s production of HEU and plutonium for nuclear weapons. This allows improved estimates of the amount of HEU and plutonium China has produced and of its current stockpiles.