13 Items

Analysis & Opinions - Yale Journal of International Affairs

Will Iran Cheat? The Reliability of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

| March 14, 2016

"On July 14, 2015 the P-5 plus 1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany) and Iran concluded a landmark agreement to verifiably restrict Iran’s nuclear activities—largely for a ten to fifteen-year period of time—in exchange for sanctions relief. Since then the agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), has already weathered several storms. Domestic critics in both Washington and Tehran assailed their administrations for having made too many concessions but eventually failed to thwart the accord. Iran moved on to meet its key obligations and on January 16, 2016, the JCPOA’s official implementation was announced..."

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad  during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, October 20, 2015.


Analysis & Opinions - Moscow Times

Russia Must Abandon Assad to Fight Terrorism

| November 13, 2015

"The key to a solution to both — the quagmire that has unfolded in Syria and the threat posed by Islamic terrorism — is to deprive the terrorist groups of their main propaganda tools and to form a new Syrian government that excludes Assad (and his foreign Shiite allies) but includes representatives from all of the non-fundamentalist groups involved in the civil war."

International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde meets Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, March 16, 2015.

Wikimedia CC 2.0

Analysis & Opinions - The Diplomat

Taking Stock of Modinomics: India's Economic Course One Year Later

| June 10, 2015

"India's growth, however, is still hindered by its deficit, its limited trade with other countries, and its restrictive labor laws. The long-term success of India's economy and the Modi administration depend on Modi's readiness to go beyond pro-business reforms as India knows them and to embrace a more ambitious agenda...."

Journal Article - St Anthony's International Review St. Anthony’s International Review

Beyond Carrots and Sticks: The Role of Status Ambitions and the NPT's “Double Standard” in Nuclear Arms Control Negotiations

| May 2015

This article examines why India walked away from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). After having spent years strongly advocating for a test ban accord, India changed course in the aftermath of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's (NPT) indefinite extension in 1995, becoming the most outspoken opponent of the CTBT. This article argues that India's reversal cannot be explained by the conventional wisdom about (non-)compliance in nuclear arms control negotiations, which usually highlights the power of material interests. Since there was no development in the nuclear realm that might have compromised India's interests prior to its decision to change course, these theories fall short of explaining India's sudden opposition to the CTBT. The same holds true for the influence of norms. This article instead argues that perceived disrespect precipitated India's decision to abandon the treaty. India criticized the NPT as biased because it enforced non-proliferation without obligating the nuclear superpowers to disarm. Similarly, New Delhi believed the NPT's indefinite renewal made a mockery of a proud country's political claims.

President Barack Obama and First Lady Michelle Obama view the Republic Day Parade with President Pranab Mukherjee and Prime Minister Narendra Modi from the Rajpath saluting base in New Delhi, India. January 26, 2015.

Lawrence Jackson

Analysis & Opinions - The National Interest

Pomp and Circumstance: The Challenge and Complexity of Engaging India

| January 30, 2015

"...[I]t was important to reassure India that America is sensitive to New Delhi's role in the world and respects India's traditions and achievements. At a time of bilateral engagement, the president's visit has further contributed to creating a more productive working environment for negotiators from both sides. In addition, the inclination of Indian decision makers to take countermeasures, if they deem their pride to be hurt, should have lessened, which might prevent future setbacks."

Analysis & Opinions - Los Angeles Times

Expanding Joint Plan with Iran on Uranium is Best Course for U.S.

| November 25, 2014

"Skeptics might argue that expanding the joint plan would give Iran the opportunity to undermine sanctions, but modest sanctions relief is unlikely to weaken the overall sanctions regime. The joint plan has not undermined the existing sanctions. And there would be pressure on Iran to comply with an expanded agreement since cheating probably would be met with renewed sanctions. Unlike the alternative scenarios, this approach would buy some additional time and keep Iran in check."

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry disembarks from his plane after traveling from Kabul, Afghanistan, to Vienna, Austria, on July 13, 2014 for allied talks with Iran about its nuclear program.

State Dept.

Journal Article - Washington Quarterly

The Fool's Errand for a Perfect Deal with Iran

| Fall 2014

"The P5+1 should set aside the effort to craft an all-at-once comprehensive bargain and instead adopt a strategy of negotiating incremental agreements. An incremental approach has a number of advantages. The negotiators could focus on one sticking point at a time, without having to coordinate agreement on all of them at once. Negotiators could defer currently intractable issues, like enrichment capacity, until greater trust is built or new opportunities arise. Most importantly, the compromises already achieved under the JPA could be maintained and consolidated, independently of the ups and downs of ongoing negotiations."

Analysis & Opinions - The National Interest

Why There Won't Be a Nuclear Grand Bargain with Iran

| July 17, 2014

"Rather than continuing with the current objective of a comprehensive grand bargain, the United States and its partners in the P5+1 should instead work toward a series of interim agreements using the JPOA as a model, with each successive accord building on the last. Such a gradual, incremental approach offers a better chance of ultimately resolving the nuclear dispute, at a lower risk of the existing deal falling apart."

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry chats with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Deshchytsia before the two joined with Russian and EU officials for 4-way talks about Ukraine in Geneva, Switzerland, on April 17, 2014.

State Dept. Photo

Analysis & Opinions - The National Interest

Blowback: Why Getting Tough on Russia over Ukraine Might Backfire

| May 16, 2014

"Washington needs to make a decision about its foreign-policy priorities, if tensions in eastern Ukraine are not reduced. Giving the events in Ukraine priority over all other international developments is a hazardous strategy. Negotiations have gotten us nowhere, and way more assertive steps against Russia are not likely to make Putin give in, since he seems to be determined not to lose his influence over eastern Ukraine and eager to demonstrate Russia's power."