Nuclear Issues

Next month, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)—an intergovernmental body that sets and promotes worldwide anti-money laundering standards—will make a key decision on whether or not to lift Iran’s probationary status or place the country back on its blacklist. If put back onto the blacklist, member states would be asked to employ financial countermeasures that range from requiring extra scrutiny of Iranian-linked accounts to shutting down certain types of banking networks.

The authors analyze the U.S.–North Korea nuclear standoff and the role of back channel negotiations and then develop a game theory framework for understanding why back channels can be beneficial.

Last week, the Trump administration reimposed unilateral sanctions against Iran. This comes after the administration announced its intention to withdraw from the Iran deal in April, despite compelling reasons not to. Like most of America’s sanctions regimes, Trump’s order to reimpose sanctions rests on authority granted under a little-known and even less understood statute that gives the president sweeping authority to regulate certain aspects of international trade and commerce: the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

Today, both Russia and the United States are modernizing their nuclear forces to keep these threats robust for decades to come — though their forces’ total numbers are limited by treaties (thank goodness). The U.S. program is expected to cost $1.2 trillion over 30 years, and the Trump administration has added new, smaller nuclear weapons that critics warn might seem more usable should war come. Russia’s program includes entirely new types of strategic weapons, from an intercontinental torpedo designed to blow up U.S. coastal cities to a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile.

Chuck Freilich argues that life in Israel today is actually quite good and pleasant, the occasional external or domestic irritant, notwithstanding.

Chuck Freilich describes Russia's growing influence across the Middle East and North Africa, which includes conventional arms and nuclear reactor sales coupled with deft diplomacy. Vladimir Putin, he argues, is exploiting U.S. disengagement from the region to restore Russia to Great Power status.

Stephen Walt has four answers to the following question: What should other states do about U.S. power?

Two months after President Trump declared his summit meeting in Singapore with Kim Jong-un a complete success, North Korea has not yet even agreed to provide that list during private exchanges with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, according to American and South Korean officials familiar with the talks.

‘Third countries’ are frequently exploited by those involved in networks to transfer proliferation-sensitive technologies, allowing procurement agents to obscure the end user or vendor located in the proliferating state, and to deceive industry, export licensing officials, and intelligence services. While ‘third countries’ frequently feature in illicit transactions, the academic literature exploring the roles played by entities in these jurisdictions is limited. Building on the sanctions busting literature, this article proposes a loose typology considering the ways in which third countries can be exploited by proliferation networks. The typology is illustrated using three cases involving entities based in Malaysia – A. Q. Khan’s nuclear black market network, and Iran and North Korea’s efforts to procure and market WMD-related and military goods. These cases are used to generate insights into proliferators’ selection of ‘third country’ hubs. The article argues that while exploitation of third countries by proliferation networks is a similar, but distinct phenomenon to trade-based sanctions busting, hubs of both activities share characteristics. Furthermore, the article argues that other factors beyond the lax regulatory environment, such as level of development, and personal connections, are often as important in driving the decisions of proliferation networks. The article concludes with implications for nonproliferation policy.