Nuclear Issues

26 Items

A wide shot of President Yoon at right on the stage in the JFK Jr Forum. At left, the audience.

Martha Stewart

- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Women in Public Policy Program, Harvard Kennedy School

Belfer Center's Korea Project Co-Leads Planning for South Korean President's Historic Harvard Visit and Speech

| Spring 2023

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol visited Harvard on April 28 and delivered a major policy speech at Harvard Kennedy School’s JFK Jr. Forum. Following his speech, President Yoon joined Harvard Distinguished Service Professor Joseph Nye for a conversation about security and soft power derived from the country's cultural strength. He also took questions from the large audience of students and others attending the event in person and online.

The Belfer Center’s Korea Project worked closely with Harvard University colleagues and Korean Consulate General counterparts to arrange for the visit and the Harvard speech, the first for a sitting South Korean president. The Kennedy School's Institute of Politics and the Korea Project co-sponsored the historic speech. 

The China Questions 2 book cover

Harvard University Press

Book Chapter - Harvard University Press

Where Do Divergent US and Chinese Approaches to Dealing with North Korea Lead?

| August 2022

For the United States, the dominant approach has been economic coercion. Despite applying stringent sanctions, the United States has been ineffective in convincing North Korea to give up its nuclear arsenal in return for a brighter economic and diplomatic future. The myriad U.S. sanctions have also failed to halt major progress in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. However, these setbacks have not caused the United States to change its strategy of economic coercion. On the contrary, the United States has considerably increased its use of this economic statecraft tool. In contrast, China has deepened its economic engagement with the North Korean regime since the late 2000s. Through the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and its counterpart the Workers’ Party of Korea, China has cultivated and monetized political ties. Doing so has provided a powerful mechanism through which the Kim family regime—leaders of North Korea’s ruling and prosperous 1 percent—has shored up stability and thrived.

A satellite photo showing heavy snows along the Korean coast, mid-February 2011.

NASA images courtesy MODIS Rapid Response Team at NASA GSFC

Report - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

A Policy of Public Diplomacy with North Korea

| August 2021

The Biden administration has emphasized the importance of alliances and core values of democracy in its foreign policy approach. Given this emphasis, public diplomacy—activities intended to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences—should be considered an essential tool in achieving our long-term policy objectives in North Korea. Public diplomacy has the potential to spur domestic change in North Korea—change that could result in improved human rights conditions, leading to behavioral change in the Kim regime, and eventually denuclearization.

Photo of U.S. Gen. Vincent Brooks commander of the United Nations Command, U.S. Forces Korea and Combined Forces Command, speaks during an opening ceremony for the new headquarters of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, South Korea. Friday, June 29, 2018.

(AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon, Pool)

Magazine Article

'This Is a Window of Opportunity.' Ret. General Vincent K. Brooks on Why Things Might Be Moving Again With North Korea

| June 24, 2021

Few know the intricacies of the North Korean problem better than General Vincent K. Brooks, who retired from active duty in January 2019 as a four-star general in command of over 600,000 Koreans and Americans comprising the U.S. Forces Korea, U.N. Command and ROK-U.S. Combined Forces. He also previously served as commanding general of U.S. Army Pacific.

Now a Senior Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, General Brooks spoke to TIME about opportunities for a breakthrough with North Korea during the Biden Administration.

In this June 14, 2019, file photo, South Korean army soldiers patrol while hikers visit the DMZ Peace Trail in the demilitarized zone in Goseong, South Korea. 

AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon

Implications of the 2020 Presidential Election on North Korea Policy

| Fall 2020

In the lead up to the 2020 presidential election, the Belfer Center’s Korea Project co-sponsored an event on October 6 with the Consulate General of the Republic of Korea in Boston to explore the impact of the election outcome on North Korea policy. A group of diverse policy analysts drew on their collective experience serving in various administrations and conducting cutting-edge research on North Korea for a lively panel discussion.

President Donald Trump and North Korea leader Kim Jong Un in the Demilitarized Zone

AP Photo/Susan Walsh

Analysis & Opinions - Fox News

Trump Takes Risky Gamble Meeting with Kim and Walking Into North Korea

| June 30, 2019

President Trump’s trip Sunday to the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea and his historic decision to cross briefly into North Korea was a made-for-TV diplomatic spectacular. But it was also a test of whether personal diplomacy can trump (so to speak) longstanding definitions of a country’s national interests by persuading North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to end his nuclear weapons program.

Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks to the media after the G20 summit in Buenos Aires, Argentina on December 1, 2018.

Mikhail Klimentyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP

Analysis & Opinions - Russia Matters

Putin’s Remarks on Use of Nuclear Weapons Are Confusing, But Unlikely to Constitute a Shift in Nuclear Posture

| Nov. 28, 2018

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s eschatological talk of nuclear Armageddon at this year’s Valdai forum has stirred up heated debates on how well his description of Russia’s potential use of nuclear weapons matches the country’s official military doctrine. However, a close look at Putin’s Oct. 18 remarks and Russia’s 2014 military doctrine reveals that, while Putin deviated from the language in the doctrine, he did not lie on the first use issue. Nor did he seem to be hinting at a shift in Russia’s nuclear posture. More likely, he was signaling to Washington that the existing nuclear arms control treaties need to remain in place for the sake of ensuring strategic stability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear dyad and avoiding an accidental war between the two countries.