Nuclear Issues

Leading up to and during the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, Belfer Center experts released reports, published commentary, and provided insight and analysis into global nuclear security. In advance of the Summit, the Project on Managing the Atom set the stage for discussion with the report Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement or Dangerous Decline?

An in-progress compilation of the expert commentary and analysis is available here.

A good nuclear agreement with Iran requires that we know first, what work has Iran conducted toward nuclear weapons, and second, can we guarantee that Iran has stopped and will not resume this work. If these questions are not answered correctly and completely before the negotiations conclude, the resulting agreement will be illusory.

Preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons is vital to U.S. national security interests. A key aspect of that matter is Iran’s compliance with its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and with other related agreements. It is a broad subject, but I understand the Committee has specific interests, so I will confine my statement to those topics.

In Washington, 10 years is a long time — more than two presidential terms. In the antique land of Persia, however, it is the blink of an eye. Those negotiating a nuclear deal with Tehran need to equal the patience of their Iranian counterparts.

The U.S. negotiating strategy in nuclear talks with Iran is failing. To date, these negotiations have focused almost solely on topics that Iran wants to talk about — how many thousands of uranium-enrichment centrifuges Tehran will continue to operate, and how soon sanctions will be lifted. This all but guarantees an outcome that will fail to block the Islamic Republic from acquiring nuclear weapons at a time of its choosing.

There are strong signs that nuclear weapons work continues. Understanding them is crucial to verifying and enforcing a new agreement. If we do not insist on answers before a comprehensive agreement is concluded, we will never get them.

This is the third installment of a five-part series exploring the painstaking diplomacy and intelligence efforts that led Libya and its quixotic leader, Muammar al-Qaddafi, to relinquish that country's weapons of mass destruction.

This is the second installment of a five-part series exploring the painstaking diplomacy and intelligence efforts that led Libya and its quixotic leader, Muammar al-Qaddafi, to relinquish that country's weapons of mass destruction.

The first installment of a five-part series exploring the painstaking diplomacy and intelligence efforts that led Libya and its quixotic leader, Muammar al-Qaddafi, to relinquish that country's weapons of mass destruction.

Each year, the Science, Technology, and Public Policy (STPP) Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School welcomes new pre- and post-doctoral fellows and visiting researchers to a select team of scholars exploring the critical role that science and technology play in everyday life.