Nuclear Issues

"In the next seven months, the key challenge will be to manage domestic audiences on both sides. While Rouhani and his delegation are strengthened by Khamenei's support, the Obama administration is going to be challenged by the new Congress. This could prove detrimental to the talks."

"The P5+1 should set aside the effort to craft an all-at-once comprehensive bargain and instead adopt a strategy of negotiating incremental agreements. An incremental approach has a number of advantages. The negotiators could focus on one sticking point at a time, without having to coordinate agreement on all of them at once. Negotiators could defer currently intractable issues, like enrichment capacity, until greater trust is built or new opportunities arise. Most importantly, the compromises already achieved under the JPA could be maintained and consolidated, independently of the ups and downs of ongoing negotiations."

"The Obama administration is fully cognizant of Israel's concerns and greater stakes in the nuclear talks. It is also aware that influential circles in Washington may have even greater sensitivity and sympathy for Israel’s worries. Especially important is the U.S. Congress, whose approval of any agreement reached with Iran will be crucial. This is because almost all that Iran seeks to achieve in any agreement reached—namely, significant sanctions relief—cannot be implemented without the Congress's consent. For the Obama administration, therefore, the Israeli-alliance-management challenge has an important U.S. domestic dimension as well."

"...[S]anctions played a part in changing Iran's behavior, but not because they forced Iran to return to the negotiation table out of fear of economic collapse. Rather, sanctions contributed to a transformation of the balance of power within the Iranian political system that had been already underway since 2009 — prior to the enactment of the current sanctions regime. Sanctions helped pave the way for a Rouhani victory in the 2013 presidential elections..."

The Spring 2011 issue of the Belfer Center newsletter features recent and upcoming activities, research, and analysis by members of the Center community on critical global issues. This issue highlights the Belfer Center’s continuing efforts to build bridges between the United States and Russia to prevent nuclear catastrophe – an effort that began in the 1950s. This issue also features three new books by Center faculty that sharpen global debate on critical issues: God’s Century, by Monica Duffy Toft, The New Harvest by Calestous Juma, and The Future of Power, by Joseph S. Nye.

"Following the parliamentary elections of Iraq in March 2010 and the long-time deadlock which had stalled formation of the coalition government for nearly 8 months and the West's disappointing efforts to talk with the Taliban, it is now crystal-clear that the United States cannot tackle these crises single-handedly and needs Iran's cooperation as the main regional actor in settling the crises in Iraq and Afghanistan, either during the presence and even after the withdrawal of American troops from both countries. The importance of this issue becomes manifest as one realizes that curbing terrorist activities in this region is directly connected to the establishment of security and stability in the region after the withdrawal of foreign troops. In such circumstances, Iran's role for the establishment and preservation of stability becomes crucial."

"Despite the increased controversy regarding the causes of 9/11, President Ahmadinejad's active presence in New York was another step toward a greater proximity between the conflicting visions currently dividing Iran and the United States. This may leave its mark on the forthcoming nuclear negotiations. Instead of over-emphasizing on general and international issues, Iran should focus on an accommodating role to solve regional issues which have international dimensions."

"Yet, direct strategic talks do not necessarily mean renewed friendship between Tehran and Washington; rather they imply the persuasion of each side to acknowledge the other's role and to reach a compromise on the issue of cohabitation in a region where both have vital national and security interests. Both sides would conclude that continuing in a permanent condition of mutual hostility can only inflict greater damage to their national interests. This would entail an exit from the current state of confrontation to interaction or constructive rivalry, in order to maintain their regional interests. For instance, direct talks between the United States and communist China in 1972 did not result in a friendship."

"...[S]ince sanctions and economic constraints will directly impact ordinary Iranians, they will intensify the current sense of distrust towards the West and especially the United States in all political trends and people, subsequently resulting in national mobilization and unity, thereby strengthening the hand of the Iranian government to resist the sanctions. This is the complete opposite of the result desired by the West."

"A powerful Iranian government with a national security agenda would be able to initiate direct talks with the United States, resulting in workable and tangible solutions. As is the case in the United States, the issue of direct talks is heavily influenced by domestic politics in Iran. Only a national security issue such as the nuclear program with the negotiation of a grand bargain would have the impetus and public support for initiation of a bilateral strategic dialogue. Creating political consensus among the elites is key to any possible future opening up or progress on the nuclear and various other geo-strategically pertinent fronts."