Nuclear Issues

The authors write that Vietnam will play host to a critical meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, and it will benefit from their peace efforts regardless of the outcome.

Mahsa Rouhi compares and contrasts the situations with Iran and North Korea and warns of the consequences.

Britain, France, and Germany's outreach to Trump has increasingly put them in a position where they will likely be blamed by all sides in case the nuclear deal collapses.

The authors offer three insights from Ukraine's path to denuclearization that may help deal with today’s proliferation challenges.

"...Iran's turn toward China and Russia leave the United States with less leverage for future negotiations on any issue, making it less and less likely for Iran to agree to cooperate with the United States or its allies. Thus, it is crucial to rethink these policies and come up with a more feasible plan."

Trump's strategy appears to be one of brinkmanship—rocking the boat in hopes that the other party is less risk-tolerant and will give in before the boat capsizes.

Air Vice Marshall (Ret.) of the Indian Air Force and Fellow at Harvard's Asia Institute, Dr. Arjun Subramaniam spoke at the Future of Diplomacy Project with its Faculty Director, Nicholas Burns about the intricacies of the India-China relationship.

"We should remember that the JCPOA, by design, was not a treaty or a deal to guarantee security for all, and for all time; it is not war settlement or a border agreement. Rather it is a delicate and detailed technical agreement. In fact, one of the main purposes of this agreement was to allow all parties the opportunity to build mutual trust and enhance dialogue, so that when necessary, new (or old) worries and concerns could be negotiated, leading to potential additional agreements in the future. The theory underlying the JCPOA is incrementalism."

In this essay, Hui Zhang reviews the status of spent fuel storage in China.  He suggest that China should take steps to improve physical protection, reduce insider threats, promote a nuclear security culture, and improve nuclear cyber security. He also recommends China, South Korea, and Japans’ nuclear security training centers should cooperate and exchange best practices on insider threat reduction, contingency plans for emergency response, and discuss regional cooperation for long-term spent fuel storage, including building a regional center of spent fuel storage.

China initiated its nuclear weapon program in 1955 and began to construct its fissile-material production facilities in the late 1950s. China has produced highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons at two complexes: Lanzhou gaseous diffusion plant (GDP, also referred as Plant 504) and Heping GDP (the Jinkouhe facility of Plant 814).

In 1958, China started the construction of the Lanzhou plant with advice from Soviet experts. Moscow withdrew all its experts in August 1960, however, forcing China to become self-reliant. On January 14, 1964, the GDP began to produce 90% enriched uranium, which made possible China’s first nuclear test on 16 October 1964.