Nuclear Issues

Steven E. Miller writes that U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty offers few benefits and solves no significant security problem, while raising some potential costs and obvious disadvantages.

Stephen M. Walt asks the following question: Is the real problem that Washington can't trust others, or rather that other states can't trust it? 

Staffing gaps and significant personnel changes at the State Department have raised concerns about the direction of U.S. foreign policy, especially amid public statements by President Donald Trump concerning American alliances and positions on issues around the world. Ambassador Cameron Munter invites Ambassador Nicholas Burns to share his insights and ideas, including on timely topics such as the U.S.-Russia relationship following the re-election of Vladimir Putin, Transatlantic relations and changing perceptions about the future role of NATO, and a possible meeting between President Trump and his North Korean counterpart on nuclear nonproliferation and security.

Ambassador Burns was Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs under President George W. Bush. Prior to that assignment, he was also U.S. Ambassador to NATO. Currently, Burns is the Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and also director of The Future of Diplomacy Project.

Nicholas Burns, Richard Haass, and Frank Bruni join Morning Joe in a conversation about Russia, Vladimir Putin and America's relationship with Russia, NATO, if Trump is evolving on foreign policy and the impact of the cabinet. 

The fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit took place in Washington DC from March 31-April 01, 2016.  Despite the initial apprehension about the summits in certain parts of the world, it has been a useful process.  With more than 50 countries represented from across the world, the summits elevated the level of awareness of nuclear security. Leaders of established nuclear states began to think about nuclear security in a new way, reducing complacency about the risks of terrorism and sabotage.  This thinking took shape in national and multilateral commitments in areas including nuclear security regulation, physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear forensics, protection against nuclear smuggling, and insider threats and nuclear terrorism.

The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington D.C. on 1 April issued a seven-page Action Plan in Support of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It contains steps that the summit participants commit themselves to taking and those they “advocate” the Agency “pursue”. In endorsing this plan, 2016 Summit participants focused more detailed attention on the IAEA than those who participated in the previous four nuclear security summits.

The just-concluded fourth and final nuclear security summit saw some serious progress, but also some missed opportunities.

The history of nuclear security has been described as an example of “punctuated equilibrium” -- long periods of inaction and complacency followed by events that catalyze action. U.S. history is rife with examples where the discovery of vulnerabilities or major incidents led agencies to strengthen nuclear security requirements.