Nuclear Issues

3 Items

Policy Brief - Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center

Smashing Atoms for Peace: Using Linear Accelerators to Produce Medical Isotopes without Highly Enriched Uranium

| October 2013

Accelerators can eventually be substituted for nuclear research reactors for the production of medical isotopes and for neutron-based research and other applications. The use of accelerators would reduce dependence on HEU and decrease the resulting risks. The United States and other countries should work together to provide the funding and exchange of information and ideas needed to speed up the development, demonstration, and deployment of technically and economically viable accelerator technologies to substitute for research reactors.

    Various images shown on screens at the General Satellite Control and Command Center show the launch of North Korea's Unha-3 rocket, Dec. 12, 2012, in Pyongyang, North Korea.

    AP Photo

    Policy Brief - National Bureau of Asian Research

    The Leap in North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program: The Iran Factor

    | December 2012

    John S. Park, Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Project on Managing the Atom Associate, argues that cooperation between North Korea and Iran has been a critical—yet underexamined—enabler of North Korea's recent success. He concludes that the time has come for the United States to view the two previously independent missile programs as two sides of the same coin and recommends strategies for disrupting the procurement channels between Iran and North Korea.

    This Sept. 26, 2009 satellite file image shows a facility under construction inside a mountain located about 20 miles north northeast of Qom, Iran.

    AP Photo

    Policy Brief - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

    Beyond Zero Enrichment: Suggestions for an Iranian Nuclear Deal

    | November 2009

    "Some form of negotiated agreement, if it can be achieved, is the “least bad” option for U.S. interests—but is likely to have to include some continuing enrichment in Iran. There are real security risks in agreeing to permit some ongoing enrichment in Iran, but if appropriately managed, these security risks are less than those created by a military strike or allowing Iran to continue unfettered enrichment with no agreement."