Nuclear Issues

"One category of nuclear material that has not yet been adequately addressed throughout recent Nuclear Security Summits is military stockpiles.2 Instead, the Summit process has focused primarily on reducing the risk of civilian nuclear material theft..."

The Belfer Center’s Eben Harrell and Pulitzer Prize-winning author David E. Hoffman for the first time report the details of one of the largest nuclear security operations of the post-Cold War years — a  secret 17-year, $150 million operation to secure plutonium in the tunnels of Degelen Mountain.

Without significant change in the geopolitical landscape, nuclear weapons will remain a relevant portion of America's long-term national security strategy. Therefore, the burdens and responsibilities of maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent force are paramount to ensure credibility for America and her allies. Bottom line: nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are still relevant today and for the foreseeable future. Therefore, to maintian international strategic stability we must embrace the necessity of nuclear deterrence, develop strategic policy that supports deterrence as an essential element and adequately resource the enterprise.

"The efforts that the Center has made in addressing the nuclear challenges of the post-Cold War era are anchored in the books that it has produced on the major dimensions of the problem."

Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier find that although threat reduction funding has had dramatic effects in reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism, the Bush administration’s proposed FY 2008 budget for cooperative threat reduction would reduce the overall funds available.  They propose a number of remedies, some of which have been taken up by congress in the appropriations process.

The latest report in the ongoing MTA / NTI collaboration, Securing the Bomb 2006, finds that even though the gap between the threat of nuclear terrorism and the response has narrowed in recent years, there remains an unacceptable danger that terrorists might succeed in their quest to get and use a nuclear bomb. 

The appalling events of September 11, 2001 require a major international intiative to strengthen security for such materials and facilities worldwide, and to put stringent security standards in place. This paper recommends a range of specific steps to upgrade security at individual facilities and strengthen national and international standards, with the goal of building a world in which all weapons-usable nuclear material is secure and accounted for, and all nuclear facilities secured from sabotage, with sufficient transparency that the international community can have confidence that this is the case. These steps will cost money, and accomplishing them will require sustained political leadership and reconsideration of a range of past policies and approaches.  But the costs and risks of failing to act are far higher than the costs of acting now.

Leaders at the 2010 nuclear security summit agreed on the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material in four years, but the factors that drive and/or constrain nuclear security changes are not well understood. Matthew Bunn and Eben Harrell surveyed nuclear security professionals in countries with nuclear weapons, HEU, or separated plutonium to explore this issue. This paper describes the survey, its results, and implications for strengthening global nuclear security.