Nuclear Issues

4 Items

Outside view of the UN building with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) office inside, at the International Center, in Vienna, Austria, June 8, 2012.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - Centre for International Governance Innovation

Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA

| June 2012

Published along with the report Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA — the result of more than two years of research  and examining all aspects of the Agency's mandate and operations this policy brief summarizes the report's key findings and policy recommendations for strengthening and reforming the IAEA.

A 1984 photo of a cascade of gas centrifuges used to produce enriched uranium from a U.S. gas centrifuge plant in Piketon, Ohio

U.S. Dept. of Energy

Policy Brief - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Recommendations for Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technologies

| June 2011

For several years, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has been unable to reach a consensus on the adoption of revised guidelines for its members. The most contentious issue is how to strengthen restraints on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (E&R) technologies in a manner that would be acceptable to all NSG members, and credible to the major exporting states and the nuclear industry. This issue will be back on the agenda this month when the NSG meets in plenary session.

Former soldiers with the South Korean Headquarters of Intelligence Detachment unit tear a North Korean flag during a rally against North Korea in Seoul, South Korea, May 20, 2010. South Korea accused North Korea of sinking a naval warship in March.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - United States Institute of Peace

After the Cheonan Investigation Report: What's Next?

| May 20, 2010

"While few observers take North Korea's threat of an all-out war seriously, many experts are concerned that the sinking of the Cheonan may be indicative of a North Korea that is emboldened by its perception of itself as a nuclear power that can now carry out limited strikes without fear of large-scale retaliation."

This Sept. 26, 2009 satellite file image shows a facility under construction inside a mountain located about 20 miles north northeast of Qom, Iran.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Beyond Zero Enrichment: Suggestions for an Iranian Nuclear Deal

| November 2009

"Some form of negotiated agreement, if it can be achieved, is the “least bad” option for U.S. interests—but is likely to have to include some continuing enrichment in Iran. There are real security risks in agreeing to permit some ongoing enrichment in Iran, but if appropriately managed, these security risks are less than those created by a military strike or allowing Iran to continue unfettered enrichment with no agreement."