Nuclear Issues

11 Items

Journal Article - Progress in Nuclear Energy

By Accident or by Design? Pushing Global Governance of Nuclear Safety

| August 2017

Nuclear safety governance should move towards a more robust regime including elements of international monitoring and verification. This is needed because nuclear energy production is likely to grow and new reactors will have different global dispersal, veering towards less experienced countries. In addition, there is growing interest in international and multilateral collaboration on disposal of mounting nuclear waste.

Presentation

The Evolution of the IAEA: Using Nuclear Crises as Windows of Opportunity (or Not)

| March 13, 2013

This seminar considered how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reacted to nuclear crises. The IAEA often appears not just to have weathered such crises, but to have successfully leaped through windows of opportunity presented by them. This has resulted in periodic expansions of its mandate, capabilities, and resources. The 2011 Fukushima disaster appears to be a puzzling exception, raising the question of what concatenation of factors needs to be present for the IAEA to take advantage of nuclear crises.

Outside view of the UN building with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) office inside, at the International Center, in Vienna, Austria, June 8, 2012.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - Centre for International Governance Innovation

Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA

| June 2012

Published along with the report Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the IAEA — the result of more than two years of research  and examining all aspects of the Agency's mandate and operations this policy brief summarizes the report's key findings and policy recommendations for strengthening and reforming the IAEA.

May 27, 2011: IAEA fact-finding team members visit the emergency diesel generator at Reactor Unit 6 at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant in Okuma, Japan. The generator was the only one to survive the March 11 earthquake and tsunami.

AP Photo

Presentation

The IAEA and Fukushima: Best Laid Plans, Reality Checks, and Doing It Better Next Time

| March 29, 2012

Professor Findlay analyzed the response of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the March 2011 nuclear reactor disaster at Fukushima, Japan. He compared the expectations that the Agency, its member states, and other nuclear stakeholders had of the IAEA's role in such a situation with the harsh reality. Drawing on these insights, he suggested possibilities for strengthening the Agency's capacities for handling the next Fukushima.

Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, Yukiya Amano of Japan delivers a speech at the beginning of the general conference of the IAEA, at the International Center in Vienna, Austria, Sept. 19, 2011.

AP Photo

Presentation

Unleashing the Nuclear Watchdog: Strengthening and Reform of the International Atomic Energy Agency

| October 25, 2011

Professor Findlay presented preliminary findings of his research on how the paramount global governance body in the nuclear field is fulfilling its mandate and how it might be strengthened and reformed. While addressing the confounding political and structural constraints under which the International Atomic Energy Agency operates, the main focus of the talk was on steps that the Agency itself can take to improve its performance.

The flag of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) flies in front of the Vienna headquarters at the Vienna International Center on March 27, 2009.

AP Photo

Journal Article - Daedalus

Alternative Nuclear Futures

| Winter 2010

"Our crystal ball is not clear enough to predict with confidence whether the global nuclear future will be characterized by peace and prosperity or by conflict and destruction. But we do believe that the choices made in the coming few years will be crucial in determining whether the world can have more nuclear power without more nuclear weapons dangers in the future."

A nuclear security officer armed with an AR-15 assault rifle and 9mm hand gun patrols the coastal area of the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant, May 5, 2004, in Avila Beach, Calif.

AP Photo

Journal Article - Daedalus

Reducing the Greatest Risks of Nuclear Theft & Terrorism

| Fall 2009

"Keeping nuclear weapons and the difficult-to-manufacture materials needed to make them out of terrorist hands is critical to U.S. and world security — and to the future of nuclear energy as well. In the aftermath of a terrorist nuclear attack, there would be no chance of convincing governments, utilities, and publics to build nuclear reactors on the scale required for nuclear energy to make any significant contribution to coping with climate change."

A rendering of 4 nuclear power plants to be built by a South Korea–led consortium in Sila, 330 km west of Abu Dhabi, UAE, released Dec. 27, 2009. The consortium won a US$20-billion contract to build these plants.

AP Photo

Journal Article - Daedalus

Nuclear Power Without Nuclear Proliferation?

| Fall 2009

Will the growth of nuclear power lead to increased risks of nuclear weapons proliferation and nuclear terrorism? Will the nonproliferation regime be adequate to ensure safety and security in a world more widely and heavily invested in nuclear power? The authors in this two-volume (Fall 2009 and Winter 2010) special issue of Dædalus have one simple and clear answer to these questions: It depends.

A security guard stands beside the entrance of the nuclear facility, FCN, Combustible Nuclear Factory in Resende, about 100 kilometers northwest of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on Oct. 19, 2004.

AP Photo

Journal Article - Innovations

Insure to Assure: A New Paradigm for Nuclear Nonproliferation and International Security

| Spring 2009

"No country has yet encountered major problems in its nuclear fuel supply specifically because of commercial disruptions. However, past political constraints on supply may be part of the motivation for countries like Iran to seek enrichment capability. Thus far it is unclear what other countries might be on the fence about acquiring a full fuel cycle and could be swayed not to enrich if an effective assurance mechanism could address the simply political risk. It is important for IAEA to identify these countries and the assurances they would need so that the best supply assurance mechanism can be crafted. Anticipating nuclear needs—not just for enriched uranium but also for fabricated fuel, transport, spare parts, etc.—and deciding whether and how government should help satisfy such needs is the best way to ensure that the industry develops in ways that serve the public's interests."