Nuclear Issues

Kari A. Bingen and Heather W. Williams write that if Russia plans to deploy nuclear weapons in space to target satellites, the threat is definitely serious—and the U.S. should act fast.

Early in March, the Biden administration unveiled its 19th National Security Memorandum. While the operational part of this memorandum is classified, the White House shared a factsheet on the new strategy, which is centered around three main pillars: countering weapons of mass destruction terrorism, advancing nuclear material security, and improving radioactive material security. The three-pronged strategy aims to reinvigorate long-standing approaches to risks from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and nuclear security and introduce new ways to deal with emerging threats.

Existing risk reduction tools are designed to prevent risks associated with misperception or inadvertent escalation. They are not tailored to the type of intentional escalation and risk-taking that Russian President Vladimir Putin has demonstrated with regards to Ukraine. Preventing further escalation and nuclear use will require strengthening deterrence and developing new risk reduction tools.

By many measures, Russia’s state-controlled nuclear energy company, Rosatom, has primacy in the global nuclear energy market. At any given moment, the firm provides technical expertise, enriched fuel, and equipment to nuclear reactors around the world. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and, more acutely, the Russian military’s dangerous actions at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and in the Chernobyl exclusion zone have many countries rethinking their dependence on Russian nuclear products and searching for alternatives. Additionally, the ensuing global effort to cripple Russian access to international markets calls into question the viability of current contracts, government licensing, and financial instruments involved in Russia’s nuclear exports.

La mia valutazione dei possibili rischi di uso di armi non convenzionali (anche tattiche nucleari) nel conflitto in Ucraina deriva in parte da precedenti storici importanti e in parte dalla mia esperienza diplomatica. Mi spiego meglio. Se guardiamo alla storia dei rischi nucleari, vediamo che in altri conflitti, paesi con armi atomiche hanno minacciato il loro uso per portare a conclusione il conflitto a loro vantaggio. L’amministrazione Eisenhower per esempio contemplò l’utilizzo di armi atomiche nel conflitto coreano per scoraggiare l’intervento della Cina. Israele nella famosa guerra dello Yom Kippur nel 1973 minacciò esplicitamente l’uso di armi nucleari per deterrenza nei confronti dell’invasione delle truppe arabe. In questi conflitti, tuttavia, i paesi con armi atomiche sono riusciti poi a prevalere con armi convenzionali e senza il ricorso alle armi nucleari. Abbiamo avuto altri conflitti che hanno coinvolto paesi con armi atomiche – l’Unione Sovietica in Afghanistan e l’America in Iraq – dove i paesi con arsenali atomici alla fine sono stati sconfitti ma non hanno fatto ricorso alle armi atomiche.

Il rischio atomico resta alto. Ce lo conferma un'esperta del settore, la professoressa Francesca Giovannini, direttrice esecutiva del Project on Managing the Atom presso il Belfer Center della Harvard University e già collaboratrice della CTBTO, l'organo con sede a Vienna che vigila sulla messa al bando dei test atomici.

Until now, nuclear weapons have largely been in the background of the Ukraine conflict. That changed when Russian President Vladimir Putin elevated Russia’s military status to ‘special service regime’, including its nuclear forces. In practice, this ‘special status’ could mean higher readiness and survivability of the Russian nuclear command authority along with its nuclear forces.

Putin is a nuclear bully. He has much more at stake in Ukraine than NATO does and is willing to escalate the crisis to get his way. None of this is new. What this announcement signals, however, is two things: resistance to the Russian invasion is hurting, and Putin is getting desperate. While the first point should inspire hope for Ukraine and Europe, the second necessitates caution because options for a face-saving resolution to the crisis, without resorting to massive casualties, are dwindling for Putin. But there are still a few off-ramps left, and NATO can also play a role in reducing risks of further escalation.

The political crisis and human tragedy unfolding in Europe as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will dominate national security debates for the foreseeable future. As the world’s eyes focus on this conflict in the coming days and weeks, the Biden administration will likely also be rolling out key nuclear policy documents. There will be many issues to consider, but one that shouldn’t be missed—the urgency of which has been highlighted by recent developments in Ukraine, and particularly around the Chernobyl site—is the security of nuclear materials.

Nuclear experts are trained to think the unthinkable. So, here is an unthinkable scenario that might actually happen in real life:

The battle over Ukraine drags on. From both the European Union and the United States, fresh weapons and other supplies continue to enter into Ukraine and allow the Ukrainian forces to fight on. The battle reaches what conflict resolution expert William Zartman calls “a hurting stalemate” situation. The balance of forces on the ground is not completely or perfectly symmetrical, but what was once considered a completely disproportioned asymmetry of forces has been gradually re-equilibrated, in favor of the Ukrainian forces.

Concerns are mounting about the safety of Ukraine’s 15 nuclear reactors and the possibility of an ecological disaster in the midst of the Russian invasion.

“There are contingencies but I doubt that these power plants have prepared for a full-scale invasion,” said Mariana Budjeryn, a Ukrainian research associate with Harvard University’s project on managing the atom. “In the middle of a large scale conflict, there’s a myriad of things that could happen, for which normal, even very robust, safety procedures at a nuclear power plant [would be insufficient].”