Nuclear Issues

Assaf Zoran examines the dynamics of Iran's shift from operating in the shadows or behind partners and proxies to directly attacking Israel and Pakistan.

Assaf Zoran argues that an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities may have the opposite result of prompting an escalation in Iran’s nuclear developments, a pattern previously observed in response to kinetic actions attributed to Israel.

David Kearn argues that the idea that the first use of nuclear weapons since 1945 would be by the United States in the defense of Taiwan against a conventional Chinese invasion would have significant, negative, and long-lasting, diplomatic ramifications. It is difficult to fathom the myriad potential consequences, but U.S. nuclear weapon use would almost certainly shatter the non-proliferation regime as a functioning entity, incentivize states (including China) to acquire or improve their existing nuclear arsenal, and damage America's standing globally.

David Kearn argues that even in the absence of restrictive resource and budgetary constraints, a focus on identifying and achieving concrete objectives that will position the United States and its allies to effectively deter aggression in critical regional flashpoints should be the priority given the stressed nature of the defense industrial base and the nuclear enterprise.

David W. Kearn argues that deployment of nuclear weapons cannot rectify a perceived imbalance in conventional forces in the western Pacific.

Herzog, Baron, and Gibbons (HBG) thank Haley Daarstad, RyuGyung Park, and Timea Balogh for replicating their 2022 short article in The Journal of Politics. In that article, HBG tested the malleability of U.S. public support for nuclear disarmament, specifically in the context of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Their survey experiment reveals that––despite majority public support for eliminating nuclear weapons––Americans’ backing of the TPNW can be significantly attenuated by exposure to elite and group cues opposing the treaty. The resultant article has received considerable attention from policymakers and anti-nuclear activists alike. Daarstad, Park, and Balogh (DPB) offer three main substantive points of comment on HGB's article. First, DPB indicate that the results successfully replicate and note that they “do not find any coding errors that undermine the authors’ analysis or conclusions.” Second, DPB show that the findings also replicate when partisan leaners are coded as political Independents. Finally, and most interestingly, DPB conduct gender-based subgroup analysis and show that there are heterogenous treatment effects among male and female respondents in our sample. HBG address each of these points in turn.

Mohammad Tabaar analyzes Iran's strategy to weaken Israel and divide the Middle East.

By looking beyond solely Iran’s security motivations, this paper by Sahar Nowrouzzadeh seeks to inform more holistic negotiation strategies that can potentially influence Iran’s nuclear decision-making in a manner more favorable to U.S. interests.

Abolghasem Bayyenat argues that without the JCPOA restrictions in place, Iran's nuclear program will expand and continue to acquire irreversible technical knowledge and competencies.

The hard truth is that the United States now has few good options for containing Iran’s nuclear program. It can persist with the no-deal status quo, allowing Iran to continue inching closer to a bomb while suffering under sanctions. It can pursue a return to the 2015 agreement and then attempt to get Iran to agree to a “longer and stronger” pact, as the Biden team has suggested. It can try for various other deals, either more or less stringent than the 2015 agreement. Or it can attempt to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure with a military strike, possibly setting Tehran’s progress toward a bomb back by a few years but almost certainly provoking retaliation and possibly a sprint toward the nuclear finish line.