Nuclear Issues

David Kearn argues that the idea that the first use of nuclear weapons since 1945 would be by the United States in the defense of Taiwan against a conventional Chinese invasion would have significant, negative, and long-lasting, diplomatic ramifications. It is difficult to fathom the myriad potential consequences, but U.S. nuclear weapon use would almost certainly shatter the non-proliferation regime as a functioning entity, incentivize states (including China) to acquire or improve their existing nuclear arsenal, and damage America's standing globally.

Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine illuminated the long profound shadow of nuclear weapons over international security. Russia's nuclear threats have rightfully garnered significant attention because of the unfathomable lethality of nuclear weapons. However, the use of such weapons in Ukraine is only one way—albeit the gravest— that Russia could challenge the global nuclear order. Russia's influence extends deep into the very fabric of this order—a system to which it is inextricably bound by Moscow's position in cornerstone institutions such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). From withdrawing from key treaties to stymieing resolutions critical of misconduct, Moscow has demonstrated its ability to challenge the legitimacy, relevance, and interpretations of numerous standards and principles espoused by the West.

Kari A. Bingen and Heather W. Williams write that if Russia plans to deploy nuclear weapons in space to target satellites, the threat is definitely serious—and the U.S. should act fast.

David W. Kearn argues that deployment of nuclear weapons cannot rectify a perceived imbalance in conventional forces in the western Pacific.

Pakistan’s nuclear program and perceived nuclear security concerns have attracted global attention. The varying concerns range from the potential theft of nuclear weapons or materials to the unauthorized use of a nuclear device to terrorist groups taking control of the Pakistani government. The enduring debate, however, has oscillated between these doomsday scenarios and some optimistic considerations, where various quarters have shared their satisfaction over Pakistan’s nuclear security regime and its ability to deal with the emerging challenges. To address the evolving nature of these threats, Pakistan is constantly improving its nuclear security infrastructure. It has established a comprehensive legislative and institutional structure, nuclear security systems, and has also undertaken various international obligations. To further improve nuclear security perceptions, Pakistan should adopt a more transparent approach and learn from international best practices.

Early in March, the Biden administration unveiled its 19th National Security Memorandum. While the operational part of this memorandum is classified, the White House shared a factsheet on the new strategy, which is centered around three main pillars: countering weapons of mass destruction terrorism, advancing nuclear material security, and improving radioactive material security. The three-pronged strategy aims to reinvigorate long-standing approaches to risks from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and nuclear security and introduce new ways to deal with emerging threats.

Existing risk reduction tools are designed to prevent risks associated with misperception or inadvertent escalation. They are not tailored to the type of intentional escalation and risk-taking that Russian President Vladimir Putin has demonstrated with regards to Ukraine. Preventing further escalation and nuclear use will require strengthening deterrence and developing new risk reduction tools.

By many measures, Russia’s state-controlled nuclear energy company, Rosatom, has primacy in the global nuclear energy market. At any given moment, the firm provides technical expertise, enriched fuel, and equipment to nuclear reactors around the world. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and, more acutely, the Russian military’s dangerous actions at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant and in the Chernobyl exclusion zone have many countries rethinking their dependence on Russian nuclear products and searching for alternatives. Additionally, the ensuing global effort to cripple Russian access to international markets calls into question the viability of current contracts, government licensing, and financial instruments involved in Russia’s nuclear exports.

La mia valutazione dei possibili rischi di uso di armi non convenzionali (anche tattiche nucleari) nel conflitto in Ucraina deriva in parte da precedenti storici importanti e in parte dalla mia esperienza diplomatica. Mi spiego meglio. Se guardiamo alla storia dei rischi nucleari, vediamo che in altri conflitti, paesi con armi atomiche hanno minacciato il loro uso per portare a conclusione il conflitto a loro vantaggio. L’amministrazione Eisenhower per esempio contemplò l’utilizzo di armi atomiche nel conflitto coreano per scoraggiare l’intervento della Cina. Israele nella famosa guerra dello Yom Kippur nel 1973 minacciò esplicitamente l’uso di armi nucleari per deterrenza nei confronti dell’invasione delle truppe arabe. In questi conflitti, tuttavia, i paesi con armi atomiche sono riusciti poi a prevalere con armi convenzionali e senza il ricorso alle armi nucleari. Abbiamo avuto altri conflitti che hanno coinvolto paesi con armi atomiche – l’Unione Sovietica in Afghanistan e l’America in Iraq – dove i paesi con arsenali atomici alla fine sono stati sconfitti ma non hanno fatto ricorso alle armi atomiche.

Il rischio atomico resta alto. Ce lo conferma un'esperta del settore, la professoressa Francesca Giovannini, direttrice esecutiva del Project on Managing the Atom presso il Belfer Center della Harvard University e già collaboratrice della CTBTO, l'organo con sede a Vienna che vigila sulla messa al bando dei test atomici.