Nuclear Issues

10 Items

Announcement - Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, Belfer Center

Science, Technology, and Public Policy Fellowships, 2015–2016

December 12, 2014

Each year, the Science, Technology, and Public Policy (STPP) Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School welcomes new pre- and post-doctoral fellows and visiting researchers to a select team of scholars exploring the critical role that science and technology play in everyday life.

Announcement - Science, Technology, and Public Policy Program, Belfer Center

STPP Fellowships, 2014–2015

November 25, 2013

Each year, the Science, Technology, and Public Policy (STPP) Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School welcomes new pre- and post-doctoral fellows and visiting researchers to a select team of scholars exploring the critical role that science and technology play in everyday life.

Presentation

The Evolution of the IAEA: Using Nuclear Crises as Windows of Opportunity (or Not)

| March 13, 2013

This seminar considered how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reacted to nuclear crises. The IAEA often appears not just to have weathered such crises, but to have successfully leaped through windows of opportunity presented by them. This has resulted in periodic expansions of its mandate, capabilities, and resources. The 2011 Fukushima disaster appears to be a puzzling exception, raising the question of what concatenation of factors needs to be present for the IAEA to take advantage of nuclear crises.

May 27, 2011: IAEA fact-finding team members visit the emergency diesel generator at Reactor Unit 6 at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant in Okuma, Japan. The generator was the only one to survive the March 11 earthquake and tsunami.

AP Photo

Presentation

The IAEA and Fukushima: Best Laid Plans, Reality Checks, and Doing It Better Next Time

| March 29, 2012

Professor Findlay analyzed the response of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the March 2011 nuclear reactor disaster at Fukushima, Japan. He compared the expectations that the Agency, its member states, and other nuclear stakeholders had of the IAEA's role in such a situation with the harsh reality. Drawing on these insights, he suggested possibilities for strengthening the Agency's capacities for handling the next Fukushima.

Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant is pictured before helicopters dump water on the stricken reactor to cool overheated fuel rods inside the core Thursday morning, March 17, 2011.

AP Photo

Analysis & Opinions - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Preventing the Next Fukushima

| May 26, 2011

This week, when the leaders of the G8 industrial democracies gather in France, their meeting will include discussions of what steps must be taken to strengthen global nuclear safety and global nuclear security  in the aftermath of the tragedy at Fukushima. The Belfer Center's Matthew Bunn and Olli Heinonen suggest new actions the world community should take in five key areas in order to prevent another Fukushima.

- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Belfer Center Newsletter Winter 2010-11

| Winter 2010-11

The Winter 2010/11 issue of the Belfer Center newsletter features recent and upcoming activities, research, and analysis by members of the Center community on critical global issues. This issue highlights a major Belfer Center conference on technology and governance, the Center's involvement in the nuclear threat documentary Countdown to Zero, and a celebration of Belfer Center founder Paul Doty.

 

Journal Article - St Anthony's International Review St. Anthony’s International Review

Beyond Carrots and Sticks: The Role of Status Ambitions and the NPT's “Double Standard” in Nuclear Arms Control Negotiations

| May 2015

This article examines why India walked away from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). After having spent years strongly advocating for a test ban accord, India changed course in the aftermath of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's (NPT) indefinite extension in 1995, becoming the most outspoken opponent of the CTBT. This article argues that India's reversal cannot be explained by the conventional wisdom about (non-)compliance in nuclear arms control negotiations, which usually highlights the power of material interests. Since there was no development in the nuclear realm that might have compromised India's interests prior to its decision to change course, these theories fall short of explaining India's sudden opposition to the CTBT. The same holds true for the influence of norms. This article instead argues that perceived disrespect precipitated India's decision to abandon the treaty. India criticized the NPT as biased because it enforced non-proliferation without obligating the nuclear superpowers to disarm. Similarly, New Delhi believed the NPT's indefinite renewal made a mockery of a proud country's political claims.