Nuclear Issues

Just four weeks ago, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s commander, Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, told the Associated Press that Tehran was imposing a 1,242-mile range limit on its surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. Although lax (all of Israel’s bases, and most of America’s in the Gulf and Middle East, fall within this range), this limit should be seen as a start. The question now is how much further might the United States and other like-minded countries be able to push Iran to impose tighter controls.

Two specks of uranium might determine whether or not the Iran nuclear deal succeeds or fails. The U.S. government and the IAEA must not let the issue of the Parchin particles drop. In matters atomic, even minutiae can be critical.

The attacks in Brussels last month were a stark reminder of the terrorists’ resolve, and of our continued vulnerabilities, including in an area of paramount concern: nuclear security.

The attackers struck an airport and the subway, but some Belgian investigators believe they seemed to have fallen back on those targets because they felt the authorities closing in on them, and that their original plan may have been to strike a nuclear plant. A few months ago, during a raid in the apartment of a suspect linked to the November attacks in Paris, investigators found surveillance footage of a senior Belgian nuclear official. Belgian police are said to have connected two of the Brussels terrorists to that footage.

The July deal did not solve the Iran nuclear program. At best it delayed it. America and her allies, however, must join together quickly to prepare for the day in a decade or so when the question will again be upon us.

If Iran can deny inspectors access to military sites, it will create an enormous sanctuary for clandestine nuclear weapons work. The Parchin site alone encompasses hundreds of buildings spread over a dozen square miles. If military sites in Iran are off limits to IAEA inspection, the “strongest nonproliferation agreement ever negotiated” will include the largest loophole in arms control history.

It is past time to disclose and explain Iran’s secret deals with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Although the White House has downplayed the importance of these arrangements, calling them “side deals,” they raise questions that go to the heart of President Obama’s claim that the agreement the six leading powers struck with Iran will deny it a bomb for at least 10 to15 years. These “side” understandings are crucial to evaluating the potential effectiveness of the July agreement, although Secretary of State John Kerry claims not to have read them. A draft of one of them has leaked to the Associated Press, but it raises more questions than it answers.

"The Iran deal is flawed, but its outright rejection would not advance American interests. Congress should plug some holes and mitigate other weaknesses. Most important, it can provide Iran with stronger incentives to comply with the deal."

President Obama’s top cabinet officials are on Capitol Hill this week, defending the Iran nuclear deal that was announced July 14. The deal, unanimously endorsed by the United Nations Security Council, has produced a blast wave of criticism from Republicans. Key Senate Democrats are also skeptical.

"The nuclear deal reached on July 14, 2015 between six world powers and Iran is baffling. It raises many important questions and leaves others unanswered."

In a recent article, I argued that both supporters and skeptics of the Iran nuclear deal have overstated the importance of so-called “anywhere, anytime” inspections. Such access is not as important as a complete and correct declaration by Tehran of all its relevant nuclear activities, and access for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the people and documents necessary to verify it.