Nuclear Issues

It is past time to disclose and explain Iran’s secret deals with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Although the White House has downplayed the importance of these arrangements, calling them “side deals,” they raise questions that go to the heart of President Obama’s claim that the agreement the six leading powers struck with Iran will deny it a bomb for at least 10 to15 years. These “side” understandings are crucial to evaluating the potential effectiveness of the July agreement, although Secretary of State John Kerry claims not to have read them. A draft of one of them has leaked to the Associated Press, but it raises more questions than it answers.

"The Iran deal is flawed, but its outright rejection would not advance American interests. Congress should plug some holes and mitigate other weaknesses. Most important, it can provide Iran with stronger incentives to comply with the deal."

On July 28, Hudson Institute hosted a timely conversation on the Iran nuclear deal with Senator Tom Cotton and a panel of leading experts including William Tobey of Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Hudson Senior Fellows Michael Doran, Hillel Fradkin, and Lee Smith.

President Obama’s top cabinet officials are on Capitol Hill this week, defending the Iran nuclear deal that was announced July 14. The deal, unanimously endorsed by the United Nations Security Council, has produced a blast wave of criticism from Republicans. Key Senate Democrats are also skeptical.

"The nuclear deal reached on July 14, 2015 between six world powers and Iran is baffling. It raises many important questions and leaves others unanswered."

In a recent article, I argued that both supporters and skeptics of the Iran nuclear deal have overstated the importance of so-called “anywhere, anytime” inspections. Such access is not as important as a complete and correct declaration by Tehran of all its relevant nuclear activities, and access for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the people and documents necessary to verify it.

A successful Iran nuclear agreement would have required far more than anywhere, anytime inspections, let alone the delayed, managed access with a 24-day duration provided under the Iran nuclear deal that President Obama hailed on Tuesday. What was essential is now conspicuously missing: Tehran’s submission of a complete and correct nuclear declaration, and the regime’s cooperation with IAEA efforts to verify it. Anything short of that is an illusion.

A good nuclear agreement with Iran requires that we know first, what work has Iran conducted toward nuclear weapons, and second, can we guarantee that Iran has stopped and will not resume this work. If these questions are not answered correctly and completely before the negotiations conclude, the resulting agreement will be illusory.

Senior Fellow William Tobey testified before the Senate Foreign Relations committee discussing the history of past negotiations to prevent nuclear proliferation.

As nuclear negotiations with Iran near their final stage, the question of inspections has come to the fore. If a final agreement is reached, inspections will be a principal means of assuring that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons, either by “breakout” at declared facilities, or by “sneakout” using secret sites. Given the importance being placed on inspections, what type will be necessary?  What inspection and verification regime will be needed to facilitate compliance, detect violations, and ensure effective enforcement?