Nuclear Issues

113 Items

U.S. and UK flags

Alex Brandon | AP

Report - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Forging a Democratic Decision Advantage

| October 2023

2023 marked eighty years since the wartime adoption of the BRUSA Agreement between Great Britain and the United States. This 1943 document codified the growing relationship between
U.S. and U.K. signals intelligence organizations and included policies governing the exchange of personnel and joint regulations for handling sensitive material. Security directives and protocols aligned operational processes between the democratic governments, setting new cooperative standards for nation-states battling authoritarian regimes. 

A woman stops to look at Ukrainian flags placed in memory of those killed during the war near Maidan Square in central Kyiv, Ukraine, Friday, Jan. 20, 2023.

AP Photo/Daniel Cole

Analysis & Opinions - Foreign Affairs

Russia and Ukraine Are Not Ready for Talks

| Jan. 11, 2023

No deal is possible between a Ukraine that is making steady battlefield progress and a Russia in denial of this reality. Even calling for talks today risks benefiting Moscow. But this impasse need not be permanent. By keeping up pressure on Russia, Ukraine and its partners in the West can begin to create the conditions for negotiations to succeed.

Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant is seen from around twenty kilometers away in an area in the Dnipropetrovsk region, Ukraine, Monday, Oct. 17, 2022

AP Photo/Leo Correa

Analysis & Opinions - Foreign Policy

Lessons for the Next War: Nuclear Weapons Still Matter

| Jan. 05, 2023

Foreign Policy asked 12 experts to give us their views on the most important lessons of Russia’s war. Each writer is a prominent specialist in his or her field, and they answer a broad range of questions. Why did prevention and deterrence fail? What have we learned about strategy and technology on the battlefield? How do we deal with the return of nuclear threats? Some of these lessons are general, while others apply specifically to a potential conflict in Asia. 

This photo taken from video provided by the Russian Defense Ministry Press Service on Saturday, Feb. 19, 2022, shows a Russian Iskander-K missile launched during a military exercise at a training ground in Russia.

Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP

Analysis & Opinions - TIME Magazine

Will Russia Go Nuclear? 7 Key Questions to Consider

| Jan. 05, 2023

To begin to appreciate what President Biden, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley, CIA Director Bill Burns, and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan understand that most of the press and talking heads who have been discounting nuclear risks posed by the war in Ukraine don’t, it is useful to consider answers to seven questions.

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Analysis & Opinions

In Russia’s Nuclear Messaging to West and Ukraine, Putin Plays Both Bad and Good Cop

| Dec. 23, 2022

Should a nuclear war “never be unleashed?” Can nuclear weapons be used to “ensure the safety of the Russian people?” Both, according to President Vladimir Putin, who has become fond of alternating assertive and conciliatory tones in his messaging on the conditions for the use of nuclear arms. Such discourse comes as he tries to coerce Ukraine into accepting his land grabs and prevent the West from escalating assistance to Kyiv, all while keeping China content.

President Vladimir Putin gives a speech to the members of the Russian Olympic team for the 2020 Summer Olympics in Tokyo

The Presidential Press and Information Office via Wikimedia Commons

Analysis & Opinions - The Hill

What We Got Wrong about Nuclear Risk Reduction

| May 23, 2022

Existing risk reduction tools are designed to prevent risks associated with misperception or inadvertent escalation. They are not tailored to the type of intentional escalation and risk-taking that Russian President Vladimir Putin has demonstrated with regards to Ukraine. Preventing further escalation and nuclear use will require strengthening deterrence and developing new risk reduction tools.

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Analysis & Opinions

L’invasione dell’Ucraina e il rischio nucleare.

| Apr. 19, 2022

La mia valutazione dei possibili rischi di uso di armi non convenzionali (anche tattiche nucleari) nel conflitto in Ucraina deriva in parte da precedenti storici importanti e in parte dalla mia esperienza diplomatica. Mi spiego meglio. Se guardiamo alla storia dei rischi nucleari, vediamo che in altri conflitti, paesi con armi atomiche hanno minacciato il loro uso per portare a conclusione il conflitto a loro vantaggio. L’amministrazione Eisenhower per esempio contemplò l’utilizzo di armi atomiche nel conflitto coreano per scoraggiare l’intervento della Cina. Israele nella famosa guerra dello Yom Kippur nel 1973 minacciò esplicitamente l’uso di armi nucleari per deterrenza nei confronti dell’invasione delle truppe arabe. In questi conflitti, tuttavia, i paesi con armi atomiche sono riusciti poi a prevalere con armi convenzionali e senza il ricorso alle armi nucleari. Abbiamo avuto altri conflitti che hanno coinvolto paesi con armi atomiche – l’Unione Sovietica in Afghanistan e l’America in Iraq – dove i paesi con arsenali atomici alla fine sono stati sconfitti ma non hanno fatto ricorso alle armi atomiche.

Putin at a Presentation Ceremony for Officers and Prosecutors Appointed to Higher Positions

Wikimedia Commons/ Press Service of the President

Analysis & Opinions

Attacco Nucleare di Putin? Ora Basta Un Piccolo Incidente.

| Apr. 04, 2022

Il rischio atomico resta alto. Ce lo conferma un'esperta del settore, la professoressa Francesca Giovannini, direttrice esecutiva del Project on Managing the Atom presso il Belfer Center della Harvard University e già collaboratrice della CTBTO, l'organo con sede a Vienna che vigila sulla messa al bando dei test atomici.

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Presentation - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Germany and Europe’s Reaction to the Ukraine Crisis: Implications for the West

Mar. 31, 2022

 

On March 31,  the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship and the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies hosted a discussion with Wolfgang Ischinger, former Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Harvard University Distinguished Service Professor, and Daniela Schwarzer, Executive Director for Europe and Eurasia at the Open Society Foundations, on how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as well as the brutality of its action has caused an unexpected reversal of Germany’s long time security policy and led to strong reactions in the rest of Europe, NATO, and the posture of the Biden administration. The seminar examined the dimensions and consequences of these developments for the future of the EU and the West. Karl Kaiser, Senior Fellow at the Project on Europe, moderated.