Nuclear Issues

636 Items

People inspect the wreckage of buildings that were damaged by Saudi-led coalition airstrikes, in Sanaa, Yemen, Tuesday, Jan. 18, 2022.

AP Photo/Hani Mohammed

Analysis & Opinions - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Significance of the Iran-Saudi Arabia Agreement Brokered by China

Belfer Center experts on the U.S.-China relationship and Middle East issues shared thoughts on the significance of the unexpected Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement brokered by China. 

Posters of Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in Iraq in a U.S. drone attack on Jan. 3, 2020, are seen in front of Qiam, background left, Zolfaghar, top right, and Dezful missiles displayed in a missile capabilities exhibition by the paramilitary Revolutionary Guard at Imam Khomeini grand mosque in Tehran on Jan. 7, 2022 (AP Photo/Vahid Salemi).

AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

Analysis & Opinions - Foreign Affairs

America Has No Good Options on Iran

| Jan. 17, 2022

The hard truth is that the United States now has few good options for containing Iran’s nuclear program. It can persist with the no-deal status quo, allowing Iran to continue inching closer to a bomb while suffering under sanctions. It can pursue a return to the 2015 agreement and then attempt to get Iran to agree to a “longer and stronger” pact, as the Biden team has suggested. It can try for various other deals, either more or less stringent than the 2015 agreement. Or it can attempt to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure with a military strike, possibly setting Tehran’s progress toward a bomb back by a few years but almost certainly provoking retaliation and possibly a sprint toward the nuclear finish line.

Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven meeting with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in 2017.

khamenei.ir/Wikimedia Commons

Book Chapter - Springer/T.M.C. Asser Press

Backchannel Non-Proliferation: Militarily Non-Aligned States and Nuclear Diplomacy

| July 27, 2021

What roles can small militarily non-aligned States play in nuclear non-proliferation diplomacy with actual or suspected proliferators? And how might international law shape such contributions? Current literature identifying effective approaches to nuclear non-proliferation and rollback is somewhat one-dimensional, emphasising the behaviour of great powers and international organisations. By contrast, this chapter analyses activities militarily non-aligned States may undertake supporting negotiations in accordance with international legal norms and institutions. More specifically, it explores Swedish and Swiss initiatives in the early 2000s, a period of growing tensions over the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programmes. Drawing upon resources including unpublished elite interviews, the chapter offers new insights into theoretical backchannel non-proliferation mechanisms. It complements existing literature on nuclear proliferation by offering a fuller account of diplomatic negotiations. Ongoing crises suggest many future challenges to the non-proliferation regime will emerge, and militarily non-aligned States may hold one of the few keys to facilitating dialogue. International law can both compel these States to act and provide them with influential—but often-overlooked—non-proliferation roles. Indeed, reconsidering dominant narratives about ‘players’ involved in nuclear diplomacy may provide new avenues for policy-making and theorising aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Mohammad Javad Zarif during the Munich Security Conference 2019

Balk /MSC

Analysis & Opinions - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

“Transactional” Nuclear Diplomacy May Provide a Path toward “Grand Bargains” with Iran and North Korea

| Apr. 29, 2021

Proponents of “transactional” diplomacy argue that comprehensive deals to transform political relationships are unrealistic, and that zeroing in on the most pressing issue is the only way to make any tangible progress. The “grand bargainers” retort that any deal that isn’t comprehensive will face fatal opposition from important stakeholders.

Both arguments have some merit, but the perceived distinction between them is a false one: Past engagements with Iran and North Korea were premised on the hope that piecemeal transactions could provide a platform for more sweeping diplomacy. And the best nonproliferation progress has been achieved when all sides perceived diplomatic transactions as incremental steps toward broader reconciliation.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani addresses the nation in a televised speech in Tehran on Feb. 10, 2021 (Iranian Presidency Office via AP).

Iranian Presidency Office via AP

Analysis & Opinions - Foreign Policy

Reviving the Nuclear Deal Gives the U.S. More Leverage Over Iran

| Feb. 15, 2021

While U.S. sanctions have caused Iran’s economy major challenges and limited Iran’s access to financial resources, they have not succeeded in changing Tehran’s behavior regarding its nuclear program. Indeed, Iran has not offered additional concessions. Instead, it has engaged in its own leverage-building strategy by ramping up its nuclear activities, missile program, and regional activities. Iran is not only closer to having the capacity to build a bomb, but even the political discourse of key officials on whether to cross that threshold has been shifting.