Nuclear Issues

243 Items

Joseph Nye

Martha Stewart

Audio - Harvard Magazine

How Do Past Presidents Rank in Foreign Policy?

| Mar. 02, 2020

How do presidents incorporate morality into decisions involving the national interest? Moral considerations explain why Truman, who authorized the use of nuclear weapons in Japan during World War II, later refused General MacArthur's request to use them in China during the Korean War. What is contextual intelligence, and how does it explain why Bush 41 is ranked first in foreign policy, but Bush 43 is found wanting? Is it possible for a president to lie in the service of the public interest? In this episode, Professor Joseph S. Nye considers these questions as he explores the role of morality in presidential decision-making from FDR to Trump.

Acting Secretary of Defense Mark Esper arrives in Washington, D.C. to prepare for an upcoming trip to Europe to talk with the United States' NATO allies, June 24, 2019.

Andrew Harnik (AP)

Analysis & Opinions - The Boston Globe

War with Iran Will Cost More Than the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars

    Authors:
  • Rosella Cappella Zielinski
  • Neta C. Crawford
| June 24, 2019

Like the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, war with Iran would entail vast economic, budgetary, and environmental costs, argues Linda J. Bilmes. And this is to say nothing of the potential human costs—so why, then, is the United States slipping closer and closer to making the same mistakes it did 16 years ago?

Photo taken on Feb. 15, 1989, people and relatives greet Soviet Army soldiers driving on their armored personnel carriers after crossing a bridge on the border between Afghanistan and then Soviet Uzbekistan near the Uzbek town of Termez, Uzbekistan.

(AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko)

Analysis & Opinions - Russia Matters

Lessons for Leaders: What Afghanistan Taught Russian and Soviet Strategists

| Feb. 28, 2019

The following is a selection of military-political lessons gleaned mostly from the recollections of Soviet strategists who were involved in making and executing the fateful decision to send troops to Afghanistan, as well as from writings by some of post-Soviet Russia’s prominent military analysts. Where possible, the author made an effort to relay these strategists’ analysis of the failures and successes of the intervention because he felt that such assessments, based on first-hand experience, are not always given their due in English-language literature on the subject.