Nuclear Issues

This article reviews the motivations, strengths, and weaknesses of the Nuclear SecuritySummits (NSS), both procedurally and substantively.

WASHINGTON — President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry have a simple explanation for their surprising success in getting Iran to dismantle much of its nuclear infrastructure, ship out 98 percent of its nuclear fuel and release five American prisoners: Patient diplomacy, backed by escalating economic sanctions, accomplished more than military action ever could have.

The Belfer Center’s Iran Project and the Project on Managing the Atom (MTA) co-sponsored a luncheon panel on the Iranian nuclear negotiations and the scenarios for the potential breakdown of current international talks on Iran, entitled “And Then What? Imagining the Middle East if Nuclear Negotiations with Iran Fail.”

In a standing-room-only event at Harvard Kennedy School in late September, former national security advisors from the United States and Israel highlighted the significance and the challenges of negotiating with Iran to prevent its development of nuclear weapons.

Thomas Donilon, national security advisor for the U.S. from 2010 to 2013, and Yaakov Amidror, national security advisor for Israel from 2011 to 2013, shared their views on the process of negotiating with Iran to reach an agreement on its current and future nuclear program.

Senior Fellow William H. Tobey evaluates the effectiveness of President Obama's policies to stem the threats of nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

The Summer 2014 issue of the Belfer Center newsletter features recent and upcoming activities, research, and analysis by members of the Center community on critical global issues. This edition highlights the Belfer Center’s longtime efforts to improve nuclear security and the Center's critical role in the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit to prevent nuclear terrorism. This issue also features a timeline and analysis of significant events in Ukraine during the past 20 years. We also note a bright spot in U.S.-Russian relations – a statement by the Elbe Group of retired Russian and U.S. generals cautioning the two governments not to let Ukraine and Crimea interrupt the joint efforts of the two countries to protect “our shared strategic interests.”

And much more...

The Spring 2014 issue of the Belfer Center newsletter features recent and upcoming activities, research, and analysis by members of the Center community on critical global issues. This edition highlights the Belfer Center’s deepening engagement with China and increasing collaboration with Harvard Kennedy School’s Ash Center for Democratic Governance around critical issues related to China. We announce former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd as a new Belfer Center senior fellow who will lead efforts to explore possibilities and impacts of a new strategic China-U.S. relationship. Read about this and much more.

During Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s September visit to New York to address the United Nations General Assembly, he met with a select group of scholars and journalists that included several Iranian/nuclear experts from the Belfer Center. Graham Allison, Gary Samore, Olli Heinonen, David Sanger, and David Ignatius offered their takeaways following Rouhani's visit.

As the United States and Iran approach an historic moment in their relations (or lack thereof), smart diplomatic interaction has never been more important. Belfer Center postdoctoral fellow Robert Reardon highlights the communications trap into which many policymakers fall when trying to explain this issue to the American public.

Many experts consider nuclear terrorism the single greatest threat to U.S. security. The fear that a state might transfer nuclear materials to terrorists was a core justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, more recently, for a strike against Iran’s nuclear program. The logical basis for this concern is sound: if a state could orchestrate an anonymous nuclear terror attack, it could destroy an enemy yet avoid retaliation. But how likely is it that the perpetrators of nuclear terrorism could remain anonymous? Data culled from a decade of terrorist incidents reveal that attribution is very likely after high-casualty terror attacks. Attribution rates are even higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent for incidents in which ten or more people were killed. Moreover, tracing a terrorist group that used a nuclear weapon to its state sponsor would not be difficult, because few countries sponsor terror; few terror groups have multiple sponsors; and only one country that sponsors terrorism, Pakistan, has nuclear weapons or enough material to manufacture them. If leaders understand these facts, they will be as reluctant to give weapons to terrorists as they are to use them directly; both actions would invite devastating retaliation.