Nuclear Issues

The world was in suspense a week ago wondering whether OPEC and non-OPEC producers would put more oil on tightening global markets. Turns out: Yes, they will. But, as the story does not end here, it is worth assessing where we are and how we got here. While the U.S. seems to have gotten what it wanted, it is not all good news.

Oil markets have so far reacted to President Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal without either enthusiasm or panic — without even much apparent interest. There are many good reasons for this, but also many reasons to think oil markets’ complacency could change. Fortunately, the Obama-era sanctions that Trump has moved to reimpose have some lesser-known safety valves should oil markets later overheat as a result of the Iran decision.

Dr. Ian Bremmer, expert in political risk and founder of the Eurasia Group, gave a seminar sponsored by the the Future of Diplomacy Project on Thursday, November 9 at the Harvard Kennedy School, titled “Managing Risk in an Unstable World."

"Netanyahu's actions are unprecedented in U.S. history. A foreign leader — from a country considered to be a close U.S. ally — has placed himself, frontally, between a U.S. president and a major presidential foreign policy initiative. Not diplomatic reservations, along with discrete behind the scenes efforts to improve the agreement. Not a polite request to amend the agreement, but total public opposition, designed to torpedo the agreement, along with unrealistic demands...."

Is the IAEA a strong enough institution to successfully act as a monitor of this deal?

Yes, but the problem is going to be financing. This is a really resource-intensive project. This is two decades of monitoring a number of facilities, and it's going to need a number of people and equipment. It's going to be a resource-intensive process, but that's something that world powers are signing up for, as they'll need to.

Initiating a process for discussing WMD remains feasible. But more than dates and modalities for a meeting in Helsinki are needed—fundamental reassessments are required as well. First, all parties must recognize that progress toward a WMD-free zone will require policy changes in areas only indirectly related to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their delivery systems. Second, Israel must begin to grapple in its national security strategy with certain long-term regional trends. Finally, the Arab League, Iran, and the sponsors of the WMD-free-zone process—if they truly wish to prioritize banning weapons of mass destruction—should support the establishment of a regionally-based security forum, with independent convening authority, to carry out direct multilateral discussions on regional security and disarmament.

"The foundations of a Turkey-Japan negotiation with Iran have been laid in decades of dialogue with Tehran and long-established relations focused on energy supplies. Most important, Turkey and Japan continue to maintain strong trade relations with Tehran, which allows them to include economic incentives in a potential proposal. The P5+1 cannot offer such incentives unless they lift a number of sanctions, which seems highly unlikely at the first stage."

"The never-ending negotiations about the pending fiscal cliff sometimes amount to nothing more than a dizzying array of numbers. Who can count that high? The negotiations also make us think that the only stastistics that mattered in 2012, or will matter in 2013, involve dollar signs. A year in pictures may be compelling and beautiful, but the year in numbers gives a strong hint of what to anticipate in the year ahead."