Nuclear Issues

Stephen Walt analyses the past thirty years of U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East, focusing on five events.

What drove Yevgeny Prigozhin to lead his PMC Wagner troops on a “march for justice” across southern Russia, toward Moscow? Was it a mutiny meant to overthrow Vladimir Putin and install the ex-convict in the Kremlin? Or was the owner and political leader of Russia’s most powerful private army actually — as he assured his followers — trying to convince Putin to meet his demands, which included the firing of his arch-enemies and Russia’s top generals, Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, over their poor conduct in the Ukraine war? And what made Prigozhin agree to abort the march toward Moscow, with Wagner’s reconnaissance teams reportedly spotted some 55miles south of the Russian capital, even though his demands had been left unmet? More importantly, has the rebellion weakened Putin, or has it made him stronger? And what’s next for Russia, Ukraine, and other countries whose national interests have been affected by this crisis? Finally, should we be thankful that the “march for justice” turned out the way it went? Despite having combed through hundreds of primary sources over the past several days, I still don’t have definitive answers to all of these key questions, but here’s how I would go about answering some of them if asked to do so, based on what was known as of June 29.

Stephen Walt provides A realist POV on the war in Ukraine, competition with China, COVID, and more in the second part of an interview with Foreign Policy Editor-in-Chief Ravi Agrawal.

• U.S.-Russia Elbe Group Maintains Focus on Threat of Nuclear Terrorism.
• Former Chernobyl Plant Manager Bryukhanov Dies.
• Matthew Bunn on Threat to Nuclear and Radiological Transports.
• On 9/11 Anniversary Russian Officials Call for Resumption of U.S.-Russian CT Cooperation.
• Experts Weigh in on 9/11 Anniversary.
• U.S. and Norway Agree to Eliminate All of Norway’s HEU.
• Two Soviet Nuclear Submarine Reactors Located.
• Russian Security Council: Terrorists Remain Interested in NBC.
• IAEA Adopts Resolutions on Nuclear Security, NS Center Planned.
• Allison on Risk of Mega-terrorist Attack After U.S. Withdrawal From Afghanistan.
• Arbatov Warns of Enduring Threat of Nuclear Terrorism to Russia in His New Volume.
• Russia’s New Security Strategy Drops References to CT Partnership With U.S.
• NNSA’s Non-Proliferation Budget to Decrease in ’22, Provides for US and Russian Visits.
• Should U.S.-Russian Interaction in Cyberspace Involve CT? 
• Russia’s NPP Operator Conducts Emergency Preparedness Exercise.
• Putin and Biden Discuss Terrorist Threat Emanating from Afghanistan, but No Deal.
• U.S. Experts on Ensuring Access to Neutrons While Reducing Nuclear Terrorism Risks.
• Beebe Weighs in on U.S.-Russian CT Interaction.
• Duo Detained for Alleged Attempt to Sell Americium-241.
• 12th GUMO Guard’s Sentence Upheld.
• NDAA-Mandated Group to Identify Nuclear Terrorism Risks.
• Belfer’s MTA Hosts Conference on Lessons of Fukushima and Chernobyl.
• Russia Withdraws from Uranium Hexafluoride Transportation Deal with U.S.
• Bell: U.S. Needs to Convince Russia on Contending With Nuclear Terrorism Threat.
• U.S. and Canada Complete Repatriation of HEU Material.
• Siegfried Hecker Outlines his Vision of Future for Nuclear Security Cooperation.
• Hackers Breach U.S. Nuclear Agency.
• Tobey on Assassinations of Nuclear Scientists and Terrorists.
• Rosatom Has Checked Nuclear Sites, Following a Tip on Terrorism from U.S.

Today, the origins of the concept of RW have largely been forgotten.  Indeed, since 9/11, radiological weapons have been associated mainly with non-state actors, who may not have the means or motivations to acquire and use far more lethal nuclear explosives.  A fixation on the very real dangers posed by nuclear terrorism, however, should not obscure the risks that states also may again pursue radiological weapons.

Jayita Sarkar explains why the Biden administration needs to re-conceptualize nuclear terrorism and act quickly.

Every president serving in the last two decades has said that nuclear terrorism is a significant national security threat. Analysis of this threat has been, for good reason, mostly focused on foreign extremist groups, but recent events raise questions of whether there should be greater focus in the United States on far-right, domestic extremist threats. These extremists represent a unique danger because of their prevalence in federal institutions such as the military and the potential that they might infiltrate nuclear facilities, where they could access sensitive information and nuclear materials.

How do presidents incorporate morality into decisions involving the national interest? Moral considerations explain why Truman, who authorized the use of nuclear weapons in Japan during World War II, later refused General MacArthur's request to use them in China during the Korean War. What is contextual intelligence, and how does it explain why Bush 41 is ranked first in foreign policy, but Bush 43 is found wanting? Is it possible for a president to lie in the service of the public interest? In this episode, Professor Joseph S. Nye considers these questions as he explores the role of morality in presidential decision-making from FDR to Trump.

While Iranians are suffering from the economic crisis, the US "maximum pressure" strategy is compelling them to rally around the flag, rather than try to "take down the regime". This is not only because the cultural value of resistance is relatively high, but also because the more the Iranian leadership resists foreign pressure, the more legitimacy it gains.

International concern over nuclear terrorism has grown during the past few decades. This has driven a broad spectrum of efforts to strengthen nuclear security globally, including the widespread adoption of radiation-detection technology for border monitoring. Detection systems are now deployed at strategic locations for the purported purpose of detecting and deterring the smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials. However, despite considerable investment in this area, few studies have examined how these programs are implemented or the operational challenges they face on a day-to-day basis. This article seeks to address this with a focus on radiation-detection efforts at maritime facilities. Utilizing practitioner interviews and a survey, this article identifies the factors that influence the planning and use of these systems in this fast-moving environment. The results clearly demonstrate that the implementation of these systems varies significantly across different national and organizational contexts, resulting in a fragmented global nuclear-detection architecture, which arguably undermines efforts to detect trafficked nuclear-threat materials. Greater consideration should therefore be given to developing international standards and guidance, designing and adopting tools to support key parts of the alarm assessment process, and broader sharing of good practice.