Nuclear Issues

Joseph Nye writes that some decoupling of interdependence is likely, particularly in areas related to technology that directly affect national security. But will Washington and Beijing go too far?

It seems unlikely that Russia will again possess the resources to balance U.S. power in the same way that the Soviet Union did during the four decades after World War II. But declining powers merit as much diplomatic attention as rising ones do. Joseph S. Nye worries that the United States lacks a strategy to prevent Russia from becoming an international spoiler.

Mariana Budjeryn recounts Ukraine's surrender of its inherited nuclear arsenal and the signing of the Budapest Memorandum by the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia. While the memorandum did not specify the assistance Ukraine was to receive if it became a victim of aggression, Ukrainians were led to believe that the United States would uphold its commitments to their security in the time of need, as Ukraine upheld its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation norms.

Stephen Walt writes that getting a new nuclear deal with Iran won't be easy—but the U.S. president's utter lack of principle could help guide the way.

The competition between the United States and China will decide the continent's fate—and one of them has a head start.

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has asked top experts from a variety of countries and with a variety of points of view to offer their best and most realistic advice on how the U.S.-Iran impasse might be broken, so a war that neither the United States nor Iran seems eager to begin can be averted. Chuck Freilich writes that the objective is a better deal, and a combination of coercive diplomacy, applied patiently over time, along with a willingness to compromise may make this possible. A "better deal" can only be achieved, however, if it is better for both sides. 

Stephen Walt writes an open letter to Donald Trump on how to deal with the Islamic Republic—and his own administration.

In the past 10 years, oil exports have averaged about $67 billion in Iran. Last year, they dropped by two-thirds, and they are expected to drop below $30 billion this year.  There are reasons to believe that, with appropriate policies, the country can live with this level of oil exports, albeit at a reduced standard of living, and even do itself some good in the long run by reducing its dependence on oil.

Iran has been there before. In 2012, when President Obama ratcheted up U.S. sanctions against Iran, oil exports dropped by 27.5 percent, and GDP fell by 6.2 percent. In 2015, sanctions and the collapse of oil prices further reduced oil exports to $32 billion, a decade-long low, and GDP declined by 1.6 percent. If Iran’s leadership is to successfully resist U.S. demands, it must do more than find ways to evade sanctions. A lot depends on its ability to adopt a plan that reduces the economy’s dependence on oil, while distributing the burden of restructuring equitably across social groups.

The authors analyze the Trump administration's maximum pressure policy towards Iran and describe how it targets the Iranian people directly and is counterproductive for all nuclear nonproliferation objectives.

For the Islamic Republic, resistance to Washington has become a cultural norm, and it considers independence (esteghlal) as the main achievement of the 1979 revolution.  According to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Iran would have to meet 12 conditions before the United States will renegotiate the nuclear deal and consider removing its sanctions. These conditions, which are nothing short of surrender on Iran’s part, are either set to force Iran out of the nuclear deal and therefore trigger the return of UN sanctions, or they are a thinly veiled call for regime change.