Nuclear Issues

12 Items

Chinese President Xi Jinping is displayed on a big screen in Beijing as Chinese battle tanks roll by during a Sept. 3, 2015 parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of Japan's surrender during World War II.

(AP Photo)

Magazine Article - The Atlantic

The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?

| September 24, 2015

The defining question about global order for this generation is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides’s Trap. The Greek historian’s metaphor reminds us of the attendant dangers when a rising power rivals a ruling power—as Athens challenged Sparta in ancient Greece, or as Germany did Britain a century ago. Most such contests have ended badly, often for both nations, a team of mine at the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs has concluded after analyzing the historical record. In 12 of 16 cases over the past 500 years, the result was war. When the parties avoided war, it required huge, painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part not just of the challenger but also the challenged.

Confronting the Reality of a Rising Nuclear-armed China

Shadowfox CC

Paper - Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center

Confronting the Reality of a Rising Nuclear-armed China

| April 2013

"The military buildup by China, its Asia-Pacific neighbors and the United States is creating a classical security dilemma that is increasing the potential for military conflict in the region. Although history is replete with conflicts between existing and rising powers, conflict between China and the United States is not preordained. Opportunities exist in both the diplomatic and military arenas for both countries to actively engage the other in open and direct communication to increase transparency, reduce tensions, and improve understanding. It is in the best interest of the United States, China and countries around the world to confront the reality that is a rising nuclear-armed China and, in doing so, manage its accession into the regional and world order without conflict."

News - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

New Book by Graham Allison and Robert Blackwill Explores Global Insights of “Grand Master” Lee Kuan Yew

| February 1, 2013

When Lee Kuan Yew speaks, who listens? Presidents, prime ministers, chief executives, and all who care about global strategy.

Graham Allison and Robert D. Blackwill, two leading strategic thinkers, asked Lee Kuan Yew the toughest questions that matter most to thoughtful Americans weighing the challenges of the next quarter century. The result is their new book, Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States, and the World – published today by MIT Press.

In this Sept. 24, 2010, file photo the National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) prepares for the Cyber Storm III exercise at its operations center in Arlington, Va.

AP Photo

Magazine Article - Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

The Future of Power

| Spring 2011

"The conventional wisdom among those who looked at the Middle East used to be that you had a choice either of supporting the autocrat or being stuck with the religious extremists. The extraordinary diffusion of information created in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries reveals a strong middle that we weren't fully aware of. What is more, new technologies allow this new middle to coordinate in ways unseen before Twitter, Facebook, and so forth, and this could lead to a very different politics of the Middle East. This introduces a new complexity to our government's dealings with the region."

A Chinese worker recharges an electric taxi at an EV charging station in Beijing, China, Jan. 9, 2011.

AP Photo

Journal Article - Energy

Integrated Energy Strategy for the Sustainable Development of China

    Authors:
  • Linwei Ma
  • Pei Liu
  • Zheng Li
  • Weidou Ni
| February 2011

The authors of this article propose, summarize, and present strategic ideas as policy implications for China's decision-makers. In conclusion, they determine that China should enhance strategic planning and regulation from a life cycle viewpoint of the whole society, prioritize energy saving, continuously improve incumbent energy, and rationally develop alternative energy.

A Chinese staffer is seen at the head office of Areva China in Shanghai, Nov. 5, 2010. French nuclear reactor maker Areva signed a $3 billion deal with China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corp to supply 20,000 tonnes of uranium over 10 years,

AP Photo

Journal Article - Energy Policy

Is China Ready for Its Nuclear Expansion?

    Authors:
  • Christhian Rengifo
  • Peipei Chen
  • Jonathan Hinze
| February 2011

This paper aims to provide a comprehensive assessment of the Chinese nuclear energy program and policy, reviewing its past, present, likely future developments, as well as to consider potential challenges that deserve further attention. This paper will explore reasons that have caused the existing industry, describe China's nuclear bureaucracy and decision making process to understand how different stakeholders play a role in China's nuclear energy development. This study concludes that China's existing nuclear program and industry, in combination with its current stable economic and political environment, provides a sound foundation for the planned nuclear expansion. However, challenges which are crucial to the success of the nuclear expansion will need to be addressed.

The No.1 and No. 2 reactors at the Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant in Lianyungang city, China, 22 Mar. 2009. The Tianwan power plant is designed to have eight reactors.

AP Photo

Paper

China's Current Spent Fuel Management and Future Management Scenarios

| July 2010

China's recent nuclear energy ambitions have put it in the forefront of research and development in the nuclear industry.This paper will first discuss the status of China's current spent fuel management methods and storage capability. Second, this paper will estimate and calculate the accumulated spent fuel and required spent fuel storage up to 2040 based on three different nuclear development scenarios. Third, future spent fuel management scenarios from now to 2040 are designed and financial costs and proliferation risks are evaluated and discussed associated with each scenario. Last, policy recommendations will be provided for the future spent fuel.