Nuclear Issues

42 Items

Chinese military vehicles carrying DF-41 ballistic missiles roll during a parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the founding of Communist China in Beijing, Tuesday, Oct. 1, 2019. Trucks carrying weapons including a nuclear-armed missile designed to evade U.S. defenses rumbled through Beijing as the Communist Party celebrated its 70th anniversary in power with a parade Tuesday that showcased China's ambition as a rising global force.

(AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein)

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Living with Uncertainty: Modeling China's Nuclear Survivability

| Spring 2020

A simplified nuclear exchange model demonstrates that China’s ability to launch a successful nuclear retaliatory strike in response to an adversary’s nuclear first strike has been and remains far from assured. This study suggests that China’s criterion for effective nuclear deterrence is very low.

Gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment recovered en route to Libya in 2003.

U.S. Department of Energy

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes: The Gas Centrifuge, Supply-Side Controls, and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation

| Spring 2014

Policymakers have long focused on preventing nuclear weapons proliferation by controlling technology. Even developing countries, however, may now possess the technical ability to create nuclear weapons. The history of gas centrifuge development in twenty countries supports this perspective. To reduce the demand for nuclear weapons, policymakers will have look toward the cultural, normative, and political organization of the world.

Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu chairs a cabinet meeting in Jerusalem, Sunday, June 16, 2013. He warned against easing sanctions on Iran, saying its nuclear efforts remain in hands of Iran's extremist ruling clerics.

(AP Photo/Uriel Sinai, Pool)

Magazine Article - The Atlantic

Will Iran Get a Bomb—Or Be Bombed Itself—This Year?

| August 1, 2013

"There can be no question whatsoever that in 2013 Iran could get a bomb; there is also no question that Iran could be bombed,” writes Graham Allison. “But my best judgement is that in 2013 Iran will not get a bomb, and Iran will not be bombed. To be precise, I am prepared to bet $51 of my money against $49 of those who want to bet that by December 31, 2013, Iran will either have a nuclear weapon or have been the target of a major bombing attack."

Running Out of Time on Iran, and All Out of Options

Wikimedia Commons CC

Newspaper Article - The Times of Israel

Running Out of Time on Iran, and All Out of Options

    Author:
  • David Horovitz
| June 19, 2013

"...[Y]es, I think Stuxnet had a few down sides. One of those down sides was that the actual attack code became publicly available. As far as I can tell the attack code was supposed to die and not get out onto the Internet, but apparently the same way it got into Natanz [Iranian nuclear enrichment facility], it got out...."

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad arriving at Oroumiyeh, 900 km NW of  Tehran, Apr. 7, 2010. He ridiculed President Barack Obama's new nuclear strategy, which aims to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to rogue states or terrorists.

AP Photo

Journal Article - InFocus

Armageddon and the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism

| Summer 2010

"Nuclear terrorism poses a unique threat not only because of the magnitude of the destruction, but because those most likely to perpetrate an attack may be fundamentally nihilistic and therefore undeterrable — prepared to pay any cost in loss of life in pursuit of their objectives. As millennial movements for whom the crippling and even destruction of the U.S. and Israel are sacred missions, a nuclear terrorist attack where even a devastating response is assumed may be a worthy means of ushering in a messianic era."

Britain's Prime Minister, David Cameron, right talks with U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, during their meeting in 10 Downing Street, central London on June 7, 2010.

AP Photo

Journal Article - American Interest

A Special Relationship in Jeopardy

| July/August 2010

"...[A]ll this shows is that a special relationship need not be an antiseptically harmonious and boring one to still be special. On the contrary: What is special, and atypical, is that the relationship has grown rather than suffered from its conflicts. The "long wait" in the nuclear domain was punctuated by a generous British offer of bases for U.S. B-29 bombers and culminated in unprecedented and intensified cooperation in the nuclear arena. Suez precipitated the "golden days" of the Anglo-American relationship under Macmillan, Eisenhower and Kennedy. The twin crises over the Falklands and Grenada did not prevent George Shultz from concluding that the Reagan-Thatcher relationship was "as close as any imaginable between two major leaders." The disputes over Bosnia presaged a deep cooperation in the Kosovo War. One need not look at the "special relationship" through a Panglossian lens to conclude that it has been real and durable, and has made an enormous contribution to the successful conclusion of the Cold War and the effort at maintaining international order in a disorderly post–Cold War world."

Klaus Fuchs was a German-born British theoretical physicist and atomic spy who was convicted of supplying information from the British and American atomic bomb research to the USSR during and shortly after World War II.

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Journal Article - Intelligence and National Security

The Viennese Connection: Engelbert Broda, Alan Nunn May and Atomic Espionage

| April 2009

Recently declassified materials have revealed the existence of a previously unknown network of Austrian communists in pre-war England. The group of young well-educated Viennese used unsuspecting social contacts and marriages of convenience to establish itself. Analysis of this network reveals some previously overlooked similarities between the 'Cambridge' spies Kim Philby and Alan Nunn May, as well as the emergence of a new nuclear spy, Engelbert Broda. Their wartime espionage as individuals took place at a time when non-communist British scientists were promoting the international sharing of atomic knowledge through unofficial channels. The newly released files reflect a characteristic preference of the British secret services for intelligence gathering rather than intervention and illustrate how vital leads follow from apparently trivial observations.