Nuclear Issues

After a tumultuous week of unpredictable twists and turns during President Donald Trump’s visit to Europe, anxiety levels have risen among experts and policy makers about the coming summit between Trump and President Vladimir Putin. As President Trump himself has noted, there is no shortage of issues demanding the attention of the two leaders: Syria, Iran, arms control and — who knows — maybe even Russia’s interference in America’s elections. But energy could snake its way onto the agenda, and Trump needs to be careful not to give Putin concessions in exchange for something the Russian president already plans on doing.

Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall (@LSRTweets), former Deputy Secretary of Energy and Belfer Center Senior Fellow, talks with Aroop Mukharji (@aroopmukharji) about the mystery surrounding the Energy Department’s National Laboratories, the smart grid, the U.S. nuclear arsenal, energy sources of the future, and her favorite energy bar.

In this essay, Hui Zhang reviews the status of spent fuel storage in China.  He suggest that China should take steps to improve physical protection, reduce insider threats, promote a nuclear security culture, and improve nuclear cyber security. He also recommends China, South Korea, and Japans’ nuclear security training centers should cooperate and exchange best practices on insider threat reduction, contingency plans for emergency response, and discuss regional cooperation for long-term spent fuel storage, including building a regional center of spent fuel storage.

China initiated its nuclear weapon program in 1955 and began to construct its fissile-material production facilities in the late 1950s. China has produced highly enriched uranium (HEU) for weapons at two complexes: Lanzhou gaseous diffusion plant (GDP, also referred as Plant 504) and Heping GDP (the Jinkouhe facility of Plant 814).

In 1958, China started the construction of the Lanzhou plant with advice from Soviet experts. Moscow withdrew all its experts in August 1960, however, forcing China to become self-reliant. On January 14, 1964, the GDP began to produce 90% enriched uranium, which made possible China’s first nuclear test on 16 October 1964.

China has produced plutonium for weapons at two sites: 1) Jiuquan Atomic Energy Complex (Plant 404) in Jiuquan, Gansu province. This site includes China’s first plutonium reactor (reactor 801) and associated reprocessing facilities. 2) Guangyuan plutonium production complex (Plant 821), located at Guangyuan in Sichuan province. This “third line” site also included a plutonium reactor (reactor 821) and reprocessing facility. While China has not declared officially that it has ended HEU and plutonium production for weapons, it appears that China halted its HEU and plutonium production for weapons in 1987.1

Hui Zhang presented "Thoughts on China’s Nuclear Reprocessing Policy" at the Conference of Assessing the International Nuclear Agenda, June 16-17, 2017, in Beijing.

The United States and other countries have set their sights on building a clean energy future. Whether that transition unfolds slowly or accelerates is an open question. But over the long run, most experts agree that we must head toward a low carbon energy future — not simply to avert catastrophic climate change, but also to reap the economic benefits of clean energy.

UxC's Jonathan Hinze, Executive Vice President, International, recently interviewed Dr. Hui Zhang, a respected Harvard University expert, regarding the current state and future prospects for China's nuclear energy program.

Dr. Zhang is a Senior Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Dr. Zhang has deep knowledge and insights into all aspects of China's nuclear energy program.